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I. INTRODUCTION
There has been a long-standing curiosity about why Europe destroyed
itself in 1914 by starting the catastrophe known as World War I. In the
past decade some of this interest was no doubt due to the coincidental fact
that one hundred years had passed since the events in question took place.
But the origins of the War hold a much deeper interest than that. Part of
that deeper interest stems from the perceived impact that War had on the
subsequent history not only in Europe, but in the rest of the world—the
Russian Revolution, the end of colonial empires, World War II, the Cold
War that followed, all being prominent examples of such impact. As many
historians would concur, “World War I was, without question, the defining
event of the twentieth century.”1 Even more of that deeper interest in the
origins of World War I stems from the starkly negative nature of that impact:
World War I was a catastrophe for Western civilization of a magnitude not
seen since the fall of Rome. 2 One aspect of that catastrophe has been
1. RICHARD NED LEBOW, ARCHDUKE FRANZ FERDINAND LIVES! A WORLD WITHOUT
WORLD WAR I 3 (2014).
2. There is no doubt a special place in hell reserved for those leaders in 1914 who both
saw with clarity the disaster that the War would become and, with that knowledge and the
ability to stop it, did not do so. Prime examples are British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward
Grey, who after the Austrian declaration of war against Serbia on July 28 (and thus well
before he took the steps that formally committed England to the War), advised the House
of Commons that the conflict could spread beyond Austria and Serbia and that if it did, it
would be “the greatest catastrophe that has ever befallen the Continent of Europe,”
and Helmuth von Moltke (the younger), the German Chief of Staff of the Army who on
the very same day (July 29) as he cabled his Austrian counterpart, Austrian Army Chief of Staff
Conrad von Hotzendorf, not to accept mediation and to fully mobilize the Austrian Army
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psychological: never again were we to experience the kind of Enlightenment
confidence in the goodness of our cause, the power of our reason, the
inevitability of our progress as a society to a state of greater decency and
prosperity, as was had by many of our pre-1914 European ancestors. We
miss that confidence and understandably want to know how our predecessors
allowed themselves to deprive us of it.
A third strand in the contemporary interest in the War stems from our
perception of how much was lost with the War besides our self-confidence.
Coupled with genuine puzzlement as to what there was to gain from
fighting such an immensely costly war, this generates the view that the
War—and the policies that lead up to it—was a colossal mistake on all
sides. This creates the puzzle as to how the “best and the brightest” of their
generation could have made such a mistake. World War I was not some
accident nor was it some natural catastrophe like a pandemic or an asteroid
strike. It was the product of a set of deliberate choices made by the leaders
of the most advanced countries on earth. The puzzle is how they could have
been so misguided as to destroy the system they all so admired and from
which they derived such benefit.
Historians are fond of George Santayana’s familiar saying that those
who are ignorant of history are condemned to repeat it. That view of the
utility of historical knowledge generates a fourth strand in the motivations
of those who seek to understand why World War I happened. Mistakes
can be repeated, and the avoidance of them is a good reason to understand
how and why they were made in the past. One of the best-known books
about how World War I came about was Barbara Tuchman’s The Guns of
August, first published in 1962 during the years of John F. Kennedy’s
presidency and the West’s cold war with the Soviet Union. President
Kennedy found Tuchman’s depiction (of how the bungling of Europe’s
leaders produced a war that none of them wanted) so applicable to his own
time and to the dangers of the international crises that he faced, that he
distributed the book to his cabinet and to then British Prime Minister
Harold Macmillan, urging that “We are not going to bungle into war” as
did the leaders of 1914.

against the Russians, wrote an official memo describing the war which he anticipated to follow
as one “which will annihilate the civilization of almost the whole of Europe for decades to
come.” (The quotations are from MIRANDA CARTER, GEORGE, NICHOLAS, AND WILHELM:
THREE ROYAL COUSINS AND THE ROAD TO WORLD WAR I 364, 366 (2010).)
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A fifth interest—one that has its own history as it has waxed and waned
amongst historians of the War—lies in the question of guilt and responsibility.
If the War was the mistake that it was, who made it and with what culpability?
Such an interest predominated in the decade or so after the War, scholars
in the Allied countries typically explaining the War in terms of evil German
war aims and in terms of the actions that executed those aims, and scholars
in Germany pointing the finger elsewhere, typically at Russian actions and
aims.3 At the present stage in this dialectic of responsibility, one can find
reputable work blaming virtually any one of the major participants—
France, Russia, England, or even the United States, as well as Austria and/
or Germany.4
An easily missed sixth interest in explaining World War I is different
than the five interests mentioned above, although it is in some ways the
most obvious interest. In the early 1920’s at the New York Explorer’s
Club the ill-fated Everest mountaineer, George Mallory, was reportedly
asked why he wanted to climb Mt. Everest. His famous answer, perhaps
apocryphal, was: “Because it is there.” World War I happened, and, like any
other event of human history, why and how it happened can be explained.
Doing so will illustrate the features that mark an historical explanation as
a good one, or, indeed, as an explanation at all. This sixth interest is thus
3. The German view (that Russia and France were to blame for starting the War)
was championed by the American historian (albeit funded in his research by the German
government), Harry Elmer Barnes, in his THE GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR (1926).
Barnes was seconded in more moderate form by SYDNEY BRADSHAW FAY, THE ORIGINS
OF THE WORLD WAR, two volumes (1929), Fay blaming Russia and Serbia primarily. The
Allied view that Germany was solely to blame was revived by BERNODOTTE SCHMITT, THE
COMING OF THE WAR, 1914, two volumes (1930). Although the nationalities of the authors
are now more mixed, the essential debate about war-guilt continues. Compare the revival
of the Allied view that Germany from 1912 on aimed at war so as to become a world
power, in Fritz Fischer’s GRIFF NACH DER WELTMACHT (1961), translated into English and
retitled GERMANY’S AIMS IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR (1967), with the German view that
Russia all along aimed for a general European war with which to allow it to take control of the
long sought after Straits at Constantinople, in Sean McKeekin’s THE RUSSIAN ORIGINS OF
THE F IRST WORLD WAR (2011). Co-existing alongside these polar views on war guilt
throughout the history of the question has also been the view that no one and no country
was to blame for having chosen to go to war; rather, Europe’s leaders “slithered over the
brink into the boiling cauldron of war” by inadvertence and inattention. DAVID LLOYD
GEORGE, 1 WAR MEMOIRS 32 (1933).
4. I will throughout this essay largely eschew the common practice of speaking of
countries (or capitals of countries) as if they were persons. Rather, I will focus on the actions,
intentions, and motivations of the leaders of those countries. When the identity of such
leaders is well known, their causal roles equally identified, and the number of such leaders
is remarkably small, then the intentional vagueness and the abbreviatory convenience of
speaking of “what Berlin wanted” or “what London did or didn’t do,” does not justify the
imprecision. Speaking of the actions and mental states of determinate historical persons also
avoids the hint of animism otherwise given by seemingly attributing feelings and other mental
states to collectivities of individual persons.
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one born of a curiosity about the nature of historical explanation. The
explanation of the War offered up by historians provides a convenient
example through which to examine this question in the philosophy of
history. The example is more than convenient; because of the widespread
interest in the origins of the War, explanations of it are so well developed
that one has much material with which to work in extracting the nature of
historical explanation in general. (Indeed, the material is so vast as to be
daunting to digest and summarize.)
In what follows I have no ambition to advance some novel view explaining
why the War occurred. The existing literature is rich enough in exploring
all the explanatory possibilities that I suspect that no such radically new
view in any event exists. Rather, I will pick and choose amongst existing
historical views to develop the explanation of the War that I can then use
to bring out the philosophical suppositions of this kind of historical explanation.
In so constructing a view I thus claim no originality of historical insight—
beyond whatever historiographical originality resides in: revealing the
philosophical suppositions involved in giving this kind of historical explanation;
classifying explanations into different types, choosing between genuinely
incompatible and in that sense competing explanations, recognizing those
that are not competing with one another, eliminating redundancies in explanations,
assessing the relative strengths of non-redundant, complementary explanations,
and constructing an intelligible narrative of the resulting structure of
explanations.
II. THE CACOPHONY CREATED BY THE JUMBLE OF FACTORS
PLAUSIBLY MENTIONED AS EXPLAINING
WORLD WAR I
Immersion is the historical literature explaining why World War I occurred
quickly becomes bewildering in its prolixity. Plausibly asserted to be causally
contributing factors are matters as diverse as: the German Navy build-up
(both before and after the advent of dreadnought battleships in 1906) and
the British/German Navy race; the fact that Wilhelm II remained too
long in Victoria’s womb, resulting in both his deformed arm and some
brain dysfunctions, both of which themselves contributed to the less than
ideal attitudes and behavior of Wilhelm as Kaiser; the fact that Bismarck
misjudged the need to counteract the liberal tendencies of Wilhelm’s shortlived father and thus indoctrinated the young Wilhelm to some of the
illiberal views that he held; the allowing to lapse of the Russian-German
Reinsurance Treaty by Wilhelm II, a treaty that Bismarck had so carefully
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preserved; the rise of Germany’s industrial base, so that by 1914 its steel
production (then a measure of general industrial capacity) dwarfed that of
France, and exceeded by a lesser margin even that of Great Britain; the
“Great Game” the European powers made of competing with one another to
colonize the less developed world; the structure of German Government
such that the popularity of the Social Democratic Party, although reflected
in that party’s representation in the Reichstag, had little influence on the
policies foreign and domestic undertaken by the concentration of executive
power lying in the offices of Kaiser and Chancellor; the failure of
“Manchester Joe” Chamberlain’s (Neville Chamberlain’s father) attempt
to align Germany with the U.S. and Britain in a general alignment that
could keep order of the rest of the world; the undertaking of the Boer War
by Britain and the War’s universal dislike in other European capitals,
making the almost century-long “splendid isolation” not seem so splendid
any more, resulting in an entente with the French; the French yielding to
British imperialism in the Fashoda incident on the upper Nile, making
later détente possible; the attitude supposedly common to leaders such as
Theodore Roosevelt, the Kaiser, Winston Churchill, and others, that war
was necessary both for proper masculine development of individuals and
for a nation’s vitality; the influence of Mahan’s book heralding the importance
of sea-power for great nation stature; the success of the Japanese in
successfully storming Russian positions at Port Arthur despite the Russian
defense by machine guns, inculcating a belief (particularly in French military)
in the virtues of offensive strategies for infantry despite technological
advances like machine guns, trenches, and barbed wire; the faction-divided
nature of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the threatened demise of that
Empire to those who ruled it; Russian designs on acquiring the straits so
as to gain ice-free ports for its navy and merchant marine, and the centuriesold resistance of Britain and France so as to frustrate this Russian ambition;
the less than ideal abilities of Nicholas II to deal with matters of governance;
the system of alliances that divided the Great Powers into only two camps,
that of the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance; the prior success of
European leaders to keep the two Balkan wars local; the rise of Serbian
nationalism, including the power of its terrorist organizations including
prominently the Black Hand; the long-drawn-out retreat of the Ottoman
Empire from the Balkans; the general underestimation of both British and
American war potential because of the small size (miniscule by continental
European standards) of their standing armies during peacetime; the large
military budgets of France, Germany, and Russia in the years immediately
preceding the War, particularly 1913; the examples of war judged to be a
cost-effective and successful means alternative to diplomacy, such as
Bismarck’s three wars (the Danish War, the Austro-Prussian War of 1866,
and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870); etc.
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Always mentioned, of course, in explanations of World War I, is the
precipitating event of June 28, 1914, at Sarajevo, the assassination of Archduke
Franz Ferdinand by an agent of the Serbian Black Hand, Gavrilo Princeps.
This assassination lead to the sequence of events between June 28—
August 4, 1914, that I shall shortly recount. But despite its primacy, few
historians regard this assassination of this heir to the Austrian throne and
his wife, as anything more than the proverbial “spark that ignited the powder
keg.”5 All the interesting explanatory work is said to be done by the makeup
and the construction of the powder keg itself. Thus, the jumble of factors
above (together with a far greater number I didn’t mention).
A common “solution” to the jumbled nature of the conditions making
the assassination the spark that ignited into war, is to adopt the chronological
organization of a “just so” story. One rather arbitrarily posits a beginning
to such a just so narrative—say 1870–71, the end of the Franco-Prussian
War—and describes a sequence of events that plausibly enough link up to
end in early August of 1914 with the war-declaring reaction of Europe to
the Archduke’s assassination.
Such “just so” narratives are informative, at least so long as they narrate
events that plausibly lead one to the next. Yet there is no explanatory architecture
in such narratives. There is no classifying of the factors featuring in such
stories into different kinds of explanations; there is no sorting of explanations
5. Winston Churchill’s early characterization: “The Continent was a powder
magazine from end to end. One single hellish spark and the vast explosion might ensue.”
1 CHURCHILL, THE WORLD CRISIS 1911-1918 116 (1938) (volume was originally published in
1923). There may be a few historians who cling to two fictions: (1) that there is ever a
“sole cause” for an event; and (2) that such sole causes of events like explosions are always to
be found in precipitating events like sparks, and not in equally necessary, background
states or conditions such as the presence of hydrogen and oxygen at the spark’s location.
Yet the literature of the 1950’s and 60’s on the nature of causation (including prominently
MORTON WHITE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE (1965)) should convince one
that such fictions have no basis in the reality of the metaphysics of causation; rather,
picking out “the cause” of anything is always a matter of pragmatic features such as the
manipulability of the item chosen (“causation comes with a handle,” as the historian R. G.
Collingwood used to put it); or the ignorance of the targeted audience about the item so
selected when compared to knowledge of other items (Joel Feinberg’s well-known “lantern
criterion,” as he described it); or the abnormality or unusualness of the item selected (the Hart
and Honore criterion); or the moral salience the item might have in the assessment of
responsibility (Joel Feinberg’s stain criterion”; or . . . etc. See the summary of these and
other factors in Joel Feinberg, Action and Responsibility in DOING AND DESERVING (1970).
One may not, thus, discount the constitution of the “powder keg” as a crucial part of the
explanation of why World War I began, on the supposed ground that the cause of the
conflict was Princeps’ action on June 28, 1914.
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into complementary versus competing explanations (“competing” in the
strong sense that such explanations cannot both be true, as well as in the
much weaker sense that one factor is “more important” than another);
there is no set of explicit generalizations showing why the events narrated
do link up with one another and with Europe’s reaction to the events of
June 28, 1914; there is thus no over-all assessment of why the war happened,
and no basis for judgment as to how such mistakes might be avoided
in the future.
The corrective to such lack of explanatory architecture in such purely
narrative accounts, is not to prescind away from any mention of the states
and events that such narrations narrate, and to move to Arnold Toynbeelike general laws of history. School history textbooks, for example, often
explain World War I in terms of four “isms:” militarism, imperialism,
nationalism, and authoritarianism. These suggest a view of human history
analogous to the view of the natural sciences. Supra-human “forces” caused
the War to break out, just as the forces of drought, for example, caused
the extinguishment of certain ancient civilizations.6 Yet the outbreak of a
war is not like the drought-induced fall of the of Akkadian Empire, nor
even like a car accident due to failure of one’s brakes and a child being in
the wrong place at the wrong time; starting a war does not “just happen”
but is the result of deliberate choices by those with the power to effectuate
such choices in their actions. World War I is no different than other wars in
this respect.7
The upshot is that there is a “bottleneck” of direct factors through which
all remote factors must operate if they are to explain the outbreak of the
War. That bottleneck is constituted by the choices made by those actors
whose actions immediately caused the war 8—not just Princeps, but the
6. Harvey Weiss et al, The Genesis and Collapse of North Mesopotamian Civilization,”
291 SCIENCE 995 (1993).
7. I thus align myself with the Marc Bloch view of the philosophy of history,
according to which, for events like the outbreak of World War I, explanations in terms of the
actions, intentions, and background motivations of human actors is primary, and explanations in
terms of social structures, traditions, and forces, is secondary. See MARC BLOCH, THE
HISTORIAN’S CRAFT (1953).
8. There is a confusion, common enough throughout the special sciences, that would
deny the possibility of there being such a bottleneck constituted by the choices and
intentional actions of persons. This is the view that if a human choice is caused then it can
do no causing. The view treats human choice as an evaporative thing so that once it is
caused it “evaporates” as a potential cause itself. Such a view is based either on a kind of
conceptual libertarianism—human choices cannot be caused and remain human choices—
or on an explicit epiphenomenalism—human choices always lose out in explanatory competitions
with the factors that cause those choices. These are both fundamental mistakes; there is nothing
precluding human choices, and the actions that execute them, from serving as causal
intermediaries. Because neuroscientists make these mistakes no less often than social
scientists, I have dealt with these mistakes in that context. See M ICHAEL S. M OORE,
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Black Hand leaders such as Serbian Army Intelligence Col. Dragutin
Dimitrijevik (code named “Apis” in the Black Hand) who eased Princeps
on his way by providing cash, weapons, and access across the Serbian/
Austrian border, and those such as Nikola Pasic, Serbia’s Prime Minister,
who tolerated the Black Hand and who decided how Serbia would respond
to Austria’s ultimatum; the leaders of Austria, principally the aging Emperor,
Franz Josef, the foreign minister Leopold, Graf von Berchtold, and the
Chief of Staff of the Austrian Army, Conrad von Hötzendorf; the leaders
of Germany, principally Kaiser Wilhelm II, the Army Chief of Staff Helmuth
von Moltke, and the Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg; the leaders of
Russia, principally Tsar Nicholas II, his foreign minister, Sergei Sazonov,
and the senior member of Russia’s Council of Ministers, A.V. Krivoshein;
the leaders of France, principally the President Raymond Poincaré and to
a much lesser extent the Prime Minister, Rene Viviani; the leaders of
Belgium, principally King Albert; and the leaders of England, principally
the foreign secretary Sir Edward Grey, the First Lord of the Admiralty,
Winston Churchill, the Prime Minister H. H. Asquith, and King George
V. As I shall detail in a succeeding section, it was the decisions (and the
actions that executed those decisions) of these men that directly caused
Europe to go to war in July/August of 1914. All of the more remote factors
such as those mentioned earlier may indeed explain why the War happened;
but if they do, they do so by operating through the bottleneck constituted
by the decisions and actions of these actors. The more remote factors operated
through such decisions and actions either by constituting constraints on the
choices seen to be possible by these actors, by providing motivations for
making the choices that they did, or by providing the background attitudes
and fixed beliefs that themselves determined their relevant motivations.
III. PRECISIFYING THE QUESTION: WHAT IS BEING
EXPLAINED, AND WHAT RELATIONS ARE
DOING THE EXPLAINING?
In philosophy there is an old adage to the effect that framing one’s question
properly is half the battle to getting a decent answer to that question. The
same would seem to be true for history and, indeed, for much of our
explanatory practices beyond these two disciplines.

M ECHANICAL CHOICES: THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE HUMAN MACHINE (2020) (chs. 1, 7,
& 8–11).
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A. Clarifying What is Being Explained: To What Do We Refer
When We Refer to World War I?
When we ask, “why did World War I happen?” what are we really asking?
There are two matters to clarify here. First and foremost: what is the event or
the state of affairs that we are seeking to explain? That is, what do we
refer to when we refer to World War I? Consider four dimensions of
indeterminacy in this question of reference.
1. The temporal duration of the War. Do we mean to explain why
there was a war lasting over the whole four years over which this
War lasted, from August 4, 1914 to November 11, 1918? In other
words, do we seek to explain why the War was a four-year long
war, or only why the War started in the first place? Explanations
of the war’s continuance (in the face of the obvious carnage, of the
seemingly hopeless stalemate on the Western front once the trenches
were established, and despite Woodrow Wilson “peace without victory”
initiative of 1916) will differ considerably from explanations as to
why in 1914 these nations began hostilities.
2. The temporal location of the War. Do we mean to explain why the
War began exactly when it did? Or why it happened at all, at any
time, in 1914, earlier, or later? If we mean the latter, we need to limit
our consideration of the possible wars (that could have substituted for
the War that was actually fought), to those possible wars that would
have been “close enough” in nature to the actual War as to be in
some sense “the same war.” Surely a delay in hostilities between
Germany and Britain such that there was a nuclear war between them
much later—say, in 1945, for example—should not count as the
same war and thus is not an aspect of what we seek to explain. Yet
just as surely a war between the same belligerents that started in
September rather than August, 1914, should count. In any case,
however, we resolve such difficult questions of trans-world identities
for events, explaining why there was a war that broke out July/
August of 1914 will be much different from explaining why there
was some such a war at all, over some different interval of time or
range of belligerent nations.
3. The spatial dimensions of the war and states involved. We need to
resolve what made World War I be the world war that it was and
we need to do this in terms of the reach of the conflict and the states
involved in it. Did the War become World War I only when Japan
joined the fight on September 23, 1914? When Turkey joined on
October 29, 1914? When Italy joined on May 23, 1915? Or only
when the United States joined on April 6, 1917? Or was the essence
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of the “World War” really a European affair, so that once Austria,
Serbia, Montenegro, Russia, Germany, France, Belgium, and England
were involved, “the war” had begun? Explaining the outbreak of a
general European war with the latter eight belligerents will be different
from explaining why each of the late comers to the party joined the
fray.
4. War as a legal status under international law versus war as physical
combat between armies. If one seeks to explain the outbreak of
the war rather than its continuation, one then needs to clarify whether
one seeks to explain why each nation took the legal action of
formally declaring war, or whether we seek to explain why soldiers
of the various armies actually engaged in physical combat with
each other. These are not the same thing, as the so-called “phony
war” of September 1939 to May 1940 illustrates. And the explanation
of each may differ.
Often indeterminacies such as these are raised to engender a skepticism
about the question possessing such vagaries of meaning. Often, for example,
one encounters such skepticism about questions of similarity or of
counterfactual dependence. About similarity judgments: since everything
is similar to every other thing in some respects, and dissimilar in other
respects,9 there is said to be no objectivity to judgments of similarity;
likewise, because asking what would have taken place if, contrary to fact,
something else that did take place had not taken place, can be made to be
true or false depending on the nature of the possible world in which one
tests such counterfactual statements, judgments of counterfactuals is often
thought not to be objective. Yet nothing could be further from the truth in
either case. All such considerations show is that to form a proper question
one has to specify what one is asking with more precision. Once we specify
in what respect(s) similarity is to be judged, and once we specify precisely
what must change and what must stay the same in the possible world in
which we ask a counterfactual question, these judgments become capable
of possessing determinate truth values. So here: I raise my four indeterminacies,
not to defeat my question, but only to precisfy it to the point where it can
be answered.

9.
(1976).

Nelson Goodman, Seven Strictures on Similarity, in PROBLEMS AND PROJECTS
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Let me now precisify my question along these four dimensions. I am
interested in explanations of the outbreak of the war, not its continuation
over the four long years of its actual duration. Further, by “outbreak,” I
mean the legal declarations of war, not the beginnings of actual hostilities
—thus why, for example, Austria declared war on Serbia on July 28, not
why it began the bombardment of Serbia’s capital, Belgrade, on July 29.
Further, the War was sufficiently underway to be World War I when the
eight original European belligerents—Germany, France, Russia, England,
Austro-Hungary, Serbia, Montenegro, Belgium—had declared war. And
finally, I mean to explain why in late July/early August of 1914 such
declarations of war were issued; I seek to explain this war,10 in other
words, not some later war between the same belligerents that would have
happened if this war had not taken place where and when it did.
B. Clarifying What Is Doing the Explaining: The Basic Relations
Underlying Historical Explanation
I have completed the first clarification of my question, which was to
clarify what we are referring to when we refer to “World War I,” along
the four dimensions that I have just explored. The second clarification deals
not with the nature of the thing explained (“the explanandum”) but rather,
with the relation(s) claimed to be doing the explaining. One might think
that this second matter is clear: what is wanted are causal explanations, so
that our question can be translated as, “What caused World War I?” I
certainly do mean to include explanations in terms of causes.11 But I also
mean to include explanations framed in terms of relations other than causation.
The main alternative here is counterfactual dependence. In explaining World
War I surely we should be interested in what was necessary for the outbreak
of the war, and not just what caused the war to occur.12 Suppose it were
true, for example, that if “Britain” (i.e., either King George in his correspondence
with the German Kaiser, or Asquith or Grey in their four party talks proposal)
10. With the caveat that “this war” includes all wars very much like World War
I in all essential qualities.
11. And I am not one of those subscribing to the philosophy of a past generation
which believed that the relation of reasons to the actions and intentions that they motivate is
non-causal so that explanations in terms of historical actors’ reasons are not causal
explanations. For the locus classicus in philosophy describing and then dismantling this
philosophy of a past generation, see Donald Davidson, Actions, Reasons, and Causes, 60
J. PHILOSOPHY 685 (1963).
12. For a defense of the place of counterfactual-based explanations in history, see
Niall Ferguson, Virtual History: Towards a ‘Chaotic’ Theory of the Past, in VIRTUAL HISTORY:
ALTERNATIVES AND COUNTERFACTUALS (Niall Ferguson ed., 1999). See also Richard Ned
Lebow, Counterfactual Thought Experiments: A Necessary Teaching Tool, 40 HISTORY
TEACHER 1 (2007).
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had made it clear to all other soon-to-be belligerents that Britain would
not remain neutral if France was attacked whether through Belgium and
Luxembourg or otherwise, perhaps “Germany” (i.e., by then the Kaiser
and von Moltke) would have blinked and not declared war on Russia or
issued its war-provoking ultimatum to France. If this is true, then the
outbreak of the war (counterfactually) depended on the non-issuance of
such clarifying communications by Britain, and surely this dithering by
Britain (itself explained in part by its preoccupation with the question of
Irish Home Rule) partly explains the War. A like counterfactual dependence
may well exist between the outbreak of the War and: the Kaiser’s “blank
check” to Austria, given July 5 in Berlin to assure Austria of support
against Russia as well as Serbia if Austria sought to punish Serbia for the
Archduke’s assassination; the reassurance of support given Sazonov by
Poincaré in the July 20–24 Franco-Russian Summit in St. Petersburg, without
which Russian mobilization would not have been ordered. Such counterfactual
dependencies, if they exist, would make each of these actions by Wilhelm
and Poincare also explanatory of the War.
Thirdly, I mean to include explanations based neither on relations of
causation nor on relations of counterfactual dependence; here I mean to include
explanations that are rather based on the distinct relation of probabilistic
dependence. Many things made World War I more likely without those
things being necessary for the War to happen and without those things being
among the causes of the war. Such probability-enhancing factors, too, explain
why World War I happened.
Later on we shall have occasion to further subdivide and refine these
three major kinds of explanations as they apply to the intentional actions
that are to be explained by reason-giving accounts of rational agents.
First, however, we need to have before us the familiar tale of what those
intentional actions were, by whom, and for what reasons. This detailing
of the “bottleneck” through which all other factors did their explanatory
work, immediately follows.
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IV. THE ACTIONS AND DECISIONS OF JUNE 28–AUGUST 4, 1914, THAT
LED TO WAR BETWEEN THE ORIGINAL EIGHT COMBATANTS
Let me restate this familiar story13 in terms of a simple timeline. The
actions taken and their relations to one another are not much in dispute. The
desires, intentions, and beliefs behind those actions have been a central
bone of contention since 1914, particularly amongst those historians seeking
to allocate blame for starting the War.
1. Early June, 1914: Princeps is supplied weapons, cash, and the
means to cross the border, by the Black Hand lead by Apis, a
senior intelligence officer in the Serbian Army. Princeps and two
of his fellow assassins is given weapons training by a Serbian Army
major, Tankositch.
2. Early June: Serbian Prime Minister Pasic vaguely warns Austria
of trouble in Sarajevo if the Archduke visits there, but does not
detail the specifics (some of which, at least, he knew).
3. June 28: Princeps assassinates Archduke Francis Ferdinand and
(apparently by mistake, Princeps was later to say) the Archduke’s
wife Sophia, in Sarajevo, Bosnia, a province recently and controversially
annexed by Austria as the southernmost extension of the AustroHungarian Empire into the Balkans. Conrad is the first senior
Austrian official to learn of the news, and he instantly regarded
the murder as a plot by the Serbians that amounted to a declaration
of war by Serbia on Austria. Conrad informs the Emperor Franz
Josef that same day.
4. June 29: Austrian Foreign Minister Berchtold informally gathers
the opinions of his fellow cabinet ministers; they and Berchtold
are, like Conrad, unanimously in favor of war with Serbia, with
one exception, Tisza, the Hungarian minister-president of Hungary.
Tisza meets with Franz Josef and may have complained that
Berchtold had already made up his mind to wage war with Serbia;
in any case, Tisza warns both Berchtold and Franz Josef that war
with Serbia “would kindle the fires of a great war. . .” Conrad urges
mobilization of the Austrian Army to commence in two days, on
July 1, but is overruled by Berchtold.
5. June 30: Berchtold meets with Franz Josef; he and the 83 year old
Emperor agree that Austria must punish Serbia in some way; that
how must await the establishing of Serbian leaders’ complicity in
13. Virtually every book on the origins of the War cited in this article has a chapter
giving the history recited in this section, and I have relied upon them all. Most detailed,
however, is the book-length treatment of this history alone, in SEAN M C KEEKIN , JULY
1914: COUNTDOWN TO WAR (2013).

556

MOORE2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 23: 543, 2022]

10/10/2022 2:30 PM

“Hang the Kaiser”
THE JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ISSUES

6.

7.

8.

9.

the assassination plot; and that (at Franz Josef’s insistence)
no punitive action was possible without Tisza’s concurrence. On
the same day the Russian general staff execute the Tsar’s earlier
order to send significant arms (120,000 rifles and 120 million rounds
of ammunition) to Serbia.
July 1: Tisza drafts and sends an anti-war memorandum to Franz
Josef and Berchtold; Tisza warns that war with Serbia would lead
Russia to intervene, and that Germany would not back Austria in
a war with Russia, a war which no one in Austria or Russia thought
Austria could win without German backing. Conrad and Berchtold
decide that they must get German assurances. The upcoming funeral
for Franz Ferdinand set for July 3 in Vienna is decided upon as the
time and place to ask Kaiser Wilhelm for such assurances.
July 2: Out of fear for his own personal safety, but publicly reporting
lower back pain as an excuse, Wilhelm announces through his
Chancellor that he will not be attending Franz Ferdinand’s funeral
the next day.
July 4: Berchtold prepares a letter to be signed by Emperor Franz
Josef informing the German Kaiser that Princeps on July 2 had
confessed enough about the assassination plot to assure Austrian
investigators of Serbian involvement (“a well-arranged plot
whose threads reach to Belgrade”) and that peaceful resolution would
be impossible; on July 4 the Austrian Foreign Minister dispatches
his chief of staff, Count Hoyos, to Berlin to deliver the letter
and to ascertain the level of German support for an invasion of
Serbia.
July 5: Count Hoyos and the Austrian ambassador to Germany
meet in Berlin to coordinate their strategy. The latter lunches with
the Kaiser and delivers Franz Josef’s letter; the former meets with
his counterpart in the German diplomatic corps, Arthur Zimmermann,
undersecretary of state.14 Zimmerman is generally reassuring of
Austria’s plans to punish Serbia; the Kaiser, despite proclaiming that
he would have to consult with his Chancellor which he had not

14. Zimmermann is later to achieve fame (of the sort usually called, “notoriety”) by
sending the “Zimmermann Telegram” that helped bring America into the War in 1917. See
Barbara Tuchman, who nicely tells the tale in her THE ZIMMERMANN TELEGRAM: AMERICA
ENTERS THE WAR, 1917-1918 (1958), albeit that Tuchman insufficiently acknowledges the
research of the University of Chicago’s esteemed historian, Friedrich Katz, in uncovering
the telegram and its provenance in Berlin.
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yet done (although he had received an affirmative answer from
Moltke that the German Army was ready for a war with Russia),
nonetheless blurts out that the Austrian ambassador could assure
his sovereign that Austria generally could rely upon “Germany’s
full support” and more specifically that in the event of this leading
to a war between Austria and Russia, that Germany “would stand
at our side.” The Kaiser later briefed his military advisers (chief
of which then present in Berlin being General Erich von Falkenhayn)
that the Austrians were ready for war against Serbia but wanted
first to be sure of Germany’s support.
10. July 6: Count Hoyos and the Austrian ambassador to Germany
meet in Potsdam with German Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg
and Arthur Zimmermann. The Austrians obtain Bethmann-Hollwegs’
blessing in the form of a blank check, the contemporaneous Austrian
understanding of which was: “Whatever we decide [about going
against Serbia], we may reckon with certainty that Germany will
stand by our side as our ally.”
11. July 7: Berchtold calls an emergency meeting of the Austrian
council of ministers to discuss the German developments. Berchtold
also communicates that two days earlier, on July 5, Franz Josef
had told Conrad that he, the Emperor, was ready to wage war with
Serbia so long as “Germany stands by our side.” Berchtold also
revealed that one day earlier, on July 6, he had informed Tisza,
the Hungarian minister and the only opponent of war with Serbia
on the council of ministers, that the German Kaiser had assured
Austria of the full support of Germany against Serbia. Tisza assents
to Austria going to war with Serbia, but attaches conditions about
certain diplomatic maneuverings taking place first; one of these
maneuverings is an ultimatum from Austria to Serbia, with the
proviso that the ultimatum cannot be so harsh that all of Europe
would know that it must be refused by any sovereign state including
Serbia.
12. July 8: Conrad and Berchtold meet and agree that an ultimatum
to Serbia be prepared with a short (24–48 hour) deadline, the
shortness of the deadline being Conrad’s suggestion to better the
chances that the Serbs would reject the ultimatum so that Austria
could declare war. Remarkably, despite the constant German
pressure for a speedy response to Serbia by Austria, Conrad and
Berchtold agree on a two week delay on the sending of the ultimatum
to Serbia. The delay was doubly motivated: first, the Austrian Army
was now on “harvest leave,” the annual leave to help bring in
Austria’s harvest (a leave on which it had not been on July 1 when
Conrad had wanted to mobilize the Austrian Army); and two,
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13.

14.

15.

16.

Berchtold needed to maneuver Tisza into agreeing to a harsher
ultimatum and one with no earlier diplomatic maneuverings as its
precondition of being sent.
July 19: Although midway through the two week delay on sending
the ultimatum agreed upon by Conrad and Berchtold the latter had
flirted with sending the ultimatum earlier than July 23, Tisza had
again frustrated such an earlier timetable by insisting that the
Council of Ministers approve the text of any ultimatum before it
was sent to Serbia, and the earliest such a Council meeting could
be held was July 19. On July 19, a Sunday, a secret meeting of the
Council was held at Berchtold’s home in Vienna, the location and
secrecy chosen in order to hide the meeting from foreign intelligence
services operating in Vienna. The sending of a 48 hour time-limited
ultimatum was agreed to (although despite Tisza’s earlier stated
condition) the specific terms of the ultimatum were apparently not
discussed. This time Berchtold gets unanimous consent of the Council
(including the Hungarian leader) to send such an ultimatum to
Serbia, an ultimatum whose terms would be such that all of the
Austrian ministers save Tisza both wanted and knew Pasic and other
Serbian leaders could not accept.
July 20: Baron Musilin, another diplomat in Berchtold’s Foreign
Ministry, finishes his drafting of an ultimatum requiring Serbia to
allow Austria to investigate the Archduke’s murder on Serbian
soil; the ultimatum is sent to the Austrian embassy in Belgrade to
be held there for three days and not to be delivered to Serbia until
July 23, the same day that President Poincare of France would decamp
from St. Petersburg on the battleship France and thus be out of
communication for several days. Musilin later brags that he was
“the man who caused the war.”
July 20-23: The “Franco-Russian summit” occurs in St. Petersburg,
with French President Poincaré and Prime Minister Viviani engaged
in talks (of which there is no written record) with Tsar Nicholas,
Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov, and others. There is little doubt
but that Poincaré satisfied Nicholas and Sazonov of France’s support
if Russia found itself at war with Germany.
July 23: The Austrian ultimatum is delivered in Belgrade while
Serbian Prime Minister Pasic is absent from the city. Serbian Prince
Alexander (later to be King of Yugoslavia after the War) solicits
the advice of the Russian ambassador to Serbia, Vasily Standeman.
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Standeman does not give the requested guarantee of Russian support
requested by Prince Alexander, stating he has no authority to issue
such an assurance; Standeman, however, telegraphs Sazonov news
of the ultimatum’s terms, and requests more arms for Serbia. Prince
Alexander also directly telegraphs Tsar Nicholas asking for Russian
support. Sazonov recognizes immediately that the Austrian ultimatum
will lead to a general European war.
July 24: Russia’s Council of Minsters meets to discuss Russia’s
position vis-à-vis Serbia and Austria; Sazonov, together with the
army and navy ministers, favors support of Serbia, which is adopted.
Sazonov then assures the Serbians (through the Serbian Ambassador
in St. Petersburg), that Russia would back Serbia against an Austrian
invasion. With the Tsar’s consent, preliminary mobilization of the
Russian Army is secretly ordered.
July 25: Within the 48 hours allowed by the Austrian ultimatum
for a Serbian response, Nikola Pasic and his ministers draft a
response to the Austrian ultimatum agreeing to all of its terms save
that affronting Serbian sovereignty, viz, the provision allowing
Austrian investigation of the assassination on Serbian soil. Knowing
that this response would not satisfy Austria, Pasic orders mobilization
of the Serbian Army four hours before the response is delivered
to Vienna.
July 25: France’s War Minster Messing orders all senior French
officers on leave to return to their units, without Chief of Staff Joffe
yet ordering mobilization of the French Army.
July 26: Franz Josef orders mobilization of three-quarters of
Austria’s army, 12 out of its 16 corps. The Austrians mobilize not just
the divisions needed to invade Serbia to the South but also the
divisions that would be needed to confront Russia in the East.
July 26: Nicholas issues additional “pre-mobilization” orders,
furthering the “informal” mobilization of the Russian Army began
on July 24 (the Army is not formally ordered to mobilize until July
30). Russian Poland—the common staging ground for a Russian
invasion of Germany as well as Austria—is placed under martial
law.
July 26: Britain’s Foreign Minister Sir Edward Grey proposes to
Germany (via its ambassador to Britain, Prince Lichnowsky) that
Germany engage with Britain, Austria, and Serbia in a four power
conference over the crisis. Bethmann-Hollweg forwards the proposal
to the Austrians but with the recommendation that they ignore it;
on the next day, July 27, Bethmann-Hollweg communicates Germany’s
rejection of the proposal to Grey.
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23. July 26: The Kaiser’s brother, Prince Heinrich, secretly meets with
King George V in Buckingham Palace and receives assurance from
George, communicated to the Kaiser, that (in Prince Heinrich’s
recounting of George’s words) “we shall try all we can to keep
out of this and to remain neutral . . .” From July 26 to July 30 the
Kaiser believes (as he put it to Admiral Tirpitz) that “he had the
word of a King” that Britain would remain neutral in a war between
Germany, France, and Russia. The Kaiser is only disabused of this
belief by Grey’s communication of July 29 to Germany’s ambassador
to Britain, Prince Lichnowsky, communicated to the Kaiser on
July 30, that Britain would not remain neutral in a war between
Germany and France.
24. July 26–28: On July 26 Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the
Admiralty, ceases the dispersal of the Royal Navy’s Grand Fleet
that had previously been scheduled and then two days later (on
July 28) orders the Fleet to its war station at Scapa Flow. On June
28 Churchill informs King George V in person that the Royal Navy
is ready for war.
25. July 27: French chief of staff Joffre telegraphs his Russian
counterparts that they could expect full French support of Russia
against Germany.
26. July 28: Emperor Franz Josef signs a declaration of war against
Serbia by the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
27. July 28: Tsar Nicholas and Wilhelm exchange the first of the
series of telegrams that came to be known as the “Nicky-Willy
correspondence;” in this first exchange on July 28, after news of
the Austrian declaration of war, they each urge the other to contain
the conflict, Russia by not intervening and Germany by restraining
Austria. The exchange continues for five days, through August 1
(when Germany declares war against Russia).
28. July 29: Actual hostilities commence as the Austrians bombard
the Serbian capital, Belgrade.
29. July 29: All Germans and Austrians are ordered by Russia’s internal
ministers to leave Russian soil.
30. July 29: German Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, with the Kaiser’s
blessing, three times telegraphs Berchtold and Conrad in Vienna
urging only an occupation of Belgrade with no further invasion of
Serbia, and to seek diplomatic rather than military solutions. At
midnight on July 30 King George V telegraphs Prince Heinrich to
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commend the Kaiser and his Chancellor for their urging of restraint
on the Austrians, and offers his own best efforts to contain the war.
Nonetheless, Bethmann-Hollweg’s request is ignored by Berchtold
and Conrad in Vienna, in part because of Moltke’s earlier that day
telegraphed advice urging complete mobilization of the Austrian
Army and rejection of mediation (and, it is alleged, in part because
Bethmann-Hollweg signaled that his advice was for appearances
sake only and was not to be taken seriously).
31. July 29–30: On July 29, after being warned by German war
minister Falkenhayn that the time for German mobilization was
now, Germany’s Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg telegraphs Sazonov
and others warning that Germany would mobilize if Russia did
not cease its own mobilization. On July 30 Kaiser Wilhelm continues
the Nicky-Willy correspondence by telegraphing his cousin the
Tsar that “If . . . Russia mobilizes against Austria . . .[there would
be no mediation possible and then] the whole weight of the
decision lies solely on your shoulders now, who have to bear the
responsibility for Peace or War.” Nicholas blinks, and throughout
the morning of July 30 consults with Sazonov about reversing
mobilization; Sazonov, with the backing of the Russian Generals,
insists the mobilization continue, stating that it could not be undone
without disaster. Nicholas relents and later on July 30 issues the
formal order for general (and public) mobilization, actual mobilization
of the full Russian army actually commencing on July 31.
32. July 30–31: On July 30 Bethmann-Hollweg and Moltke decide
on German mobilization but delay implementing even a preliminary
“declaration of a state of imminent war” until noon July 31; on
July 31 they are reinforced in their decision by receipt of the news
of the impending Russian mobilization order of the Tsar. Twenty
minutes after receipt of such news, at noon on July 31, they obtain
the Kaiser’s consent to issue a declaration of a “state of imminent
danger of war,” a precursor to mobilization.
33. August 1: Nicholas telegraphs Wilhelm one last time to say that
he understands “that you are obliged to mobilize but wish to have
the same guarantee from you as I gave you, that these measures
do not mean war. . . . Anxiously, full of confidence, await your
answer.” Nicholas received no reply but instead, at 5:00 pm on
August 1, at his residence in the Berlin Schloss, the Kaiser signs
the order of German mobilization and also signs the declaration
of war by Germany against Russia, having at 4:00 pm summoned
von Moltke, Falkenhayn, and Tirpitz to the Schloss for that purpose.
After the news of these orders reaches Nicholas on the evening of
August 1, Nicholas only then receives a reply to his earlier telegram
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to Wilhelm in which Wilhelm offers to continue talks if Russia
halts its mobilization; Nicholas views the telegram as revealing
the deceptive nature of Wilhelm’s supposed peace overtures all
along. Later in the evening of August 1 the Kaiser joyfully receives
a telegram from Prince Lichnowsky in London informing him
that Britain was now prepared to stay neutral if Germany attacked
only Russia but not France; a second telegram from Lichnowsky
on that same evening went further, transmitting supposed British
assurances that Britain would stay neutral even if Germany attacked
France as well as Russia. The Kaiser, revived in his earlier belief
(which he held between July 26–30 because of his brother’s
conversation with King George on July 26) of British neutrality,
summoned von Moltke and Falkenhayn back to the Schloss, to
announce that Germany now need only fight Russia, not France
too. Moltke (by his own later account, at least) is distressed to
the point of tears (and possibly suffering a stroke); he stresses that
the army, committed by the Schlieffen Plan to strike at France,
cannot simply be redeployed to the East to fight Russia, that there
were no plans to do such a thing. Nonetheless the Kaiser orders
the impending invasion through Luxembourg to be halted, admonishing
Moltke that his uncle (the more famous “Moltke the Elder” who
had defeated France in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870) would
not have so resisted his Kaiser’s wishes. (A dissenting account
has it that Moltke too was overjoyed at the news that he now only
had to fight a one front war.) Whosever joy it was, it was shortlived: later that same night on August 1 King George telegraphed
the Kaiser that Prince Lichnowsky was mistaken, that there was
no guarantee of British neutrality. The Kaiser, already having
prepared to retire for the night and thus in his bed clothes, then
summoned Moltke back to the Schloss for yet a third time that
evening, agitatedly but resignedly telling von Moltke to “Now do
as you please; I don’t care either way.” Moltke pleased to stick to
the Schlieffen Plan and to attack France first, and so revived the
order for the German advance into Luxembourg that very night.
34. August 1: On French Army Chief of Staff Joffre’s recommendation,
France’s Prime Minister Viviani orders mobilization of the French
Army. Later that day the French are informed by Germany that
they will be allowed to remain neutral in Germany’s conflict with
Russia only if the French surrender their key forts on the border
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with Germany, an ultimatum that would obviously be unacceptable
to the French, as indeed it was.
35. August 2: Germany delivers an ultimatum to Belgium demanding
free passage of German troops across Belgium soil so that Germany
could invade France.
36. August 3: Belgium’s King Albert refuses the German ultimatum’s
demand for free passage of German troops to France. Germany
declares war on France.
37. August 4: German troops invade Belgium; King Albert pleas for
British assistance. The British Cabinet (chiefly Sir Edward Grey,
Prime Minister Asquith, Winston Churchill, and Chancellor of the
Exchequer David Lloyd George, although with four resignations
from the Cabinet, two of which were subsequently withdrawn),
and with the backing from the House of Commons the previous
day, issues an ultimatum to Germany to cease operations in Belgium
else a state of war would exist between Great Britain and Germany
as of midnight August 4. Prior to the expiration time set in the
British ultimatum Churchill’s Royal Navy trawlers are in the
North Sea preparing to cut Germany’s undersea cables; doing so
will cut off Germany’s communications to the outside world (save
through British-monitorable shortwave). When the ultimatum
expires at 11:00 pm London time (midnight Berlin time) without
having been responded to by Germany, Britain joins the war. In
Grey’s famous prophecy given one day earlier, “the lights of Europe
are everywhere going dark and they will not again be lit in our
lifetime.”
V. A TAXONOMY OF THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF EXPLANATIONS
THAT MIGHT BE OFFERED FOR THE INTENTIONAL
ACTIONS OF JUNE 28–AUGUST 4, 1914
The outbreak of World War I (in the sense of the phase I earlier
stipulated in Part III was my interest) was a set of intentional actions between
July 28 and August 4 constituted by the four declarations of war: the July
28 declaration of war by Austria on Serbia, the August 1 declaration of
war by Germany against Russia, the August 3 declaration of war by Germany
against France and the August 4 declaration of war by England against
Germany.15 The most immediate explanation for this set of actions lies in
15. These are the causally salient declarations of war. The later declarations of war
by those already engaged are of lesser significance because of their domino-like sequencing
with the four major declarations of war mentioned in the text. Austria, for example,
declared war on Russia on August 6, five days after Germany had declared war on Russia;
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the intentions of the actors whose actions these were: Franz Joseph declared
war on Serbia because that is what he (and Berchtold and Conrad) intended
to do, Wilhelm declared war on Russia and then France because that is
what he (and Bethmann-Hollweg and von Moltke) intended to do, and
George V declared war on Germany because that is what he (and Asquith,
Grey, and the rest of the Liberal Cabinet who did not resign) intended to
do.
These most immediate explanations of the outbreak of the War are rarely
mentioned despite being quite true; this is because such explanations are
trivial and unsurprising. To be told that some action that we know to be
intentional (such as a declaration of war) was caused by an intention to do
that action, an intention held by the actor whose action it as, is not completely
vacuous—because (paradoxical as it might sound) not all intentional actions
are caused by an intention to do them.16 But it is uninformative because
so many intentional actions are so caused. Of much greater interest, therefore,
are the mental states that explain the actions preceding the declarations of
war, actions such as the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia or the assurances of
support given by the Kaiser and the French President Poincare: were these
caused by an intention to start a general European war? We should thus
focus on these earlier actions and ask after the mental states that caused
them to occur. There are different kinds of explanation of rational action,
and it should prove fruitful to taxonomize why these actors did these earlier
actions in terms of these different kinds of mental state explanations.
A. Taxonomizing Explanations of Intentional Actions by the Kinds of
Mental States Given to Explain Them
There are two dimensions to the taxonomy that follows. The first is by
the kind of mental state doing the explaining: did (for example) the Kaiser
want the war as an end-in-itself, because he was one of those “war-lovers”
who believed warfare was a virtue for both individual persons and states?17
Or did he intend the War, not because he loved war and thought that it
France declared war on Austria on August 11, five days later; England declared war on Austria
the next day, on August 12. These last declarations simply rounded out the war already
begun between the Central Powers and the Entente by the events of July 28–August 4.
16. See MICHAEL BRATMAN, INTENTIONS, PLANS, AND PRACTICAL REASONING (1987)
(rejection of what Bratman calls “the Simple View” that all intentional actions are caused
by intentions to perform that action).
17. A book-length treatment of the psychology I refer to here is EVAN THOMAS, THE
WAR LOVERS: ROOSEVELT, LODGE, HEARST, AND THE RUSH TO EMPIRE, 1898 (2010).
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was desirable as an end in itself, but as a means necessary to the attainment
of some other end (such as the pre-emption of later attack by the Russians
when the Russian army and Russian railway system would be better prepared
for war)? Or did the Kaiser take the actions he took only foreseeing
(predictively believing) that those actors would or might lead to the War?
Or, finally, were such actions undertaken by the Kaiser ignorant of their
risk of producing a general war, that is, not processing the desire, intention,
or belief just mentioned?
It is no accident that there are the four possibilities just exemplified by
these questions of the Kaiser’s mental states. For belief-desire-intention
psychology—“BDI psychology,” as it is known in the trade—has for thousands
of years played the central role in the explanation of the actions of rational
agents. For example: you want to learn something about the causes of
World War I; you believe that by reading this essay you (might, may, or
will) learn something about the causes of World War I; because of this
desire and because of this belief you therefore form the intention to read
this essay; and because of this intention you read the essay.18
Mental states like intentions, beliefs, and desires are individuated not
only by the kind of mental states they are—either a cognitive state of belief,
a motivational state of desire, or a conational state of intention, distinctions
as old as Plato’s tripartite divisions of the soul—but they are also individuated
by the content of such states. An intention to go downtown and an intention
to shop once one is downtown are both intentions; yet they are different
intentions because of their differing contents.
Consider the idea of content itself. Mental states like belief, desire, and
intention all have something called content; one doesn’t just intend, believe,
or desire simplicatur; rather, one believes that something is or will be the
case, one desires that something be the case, one intends to make something
the case. What follows the “that” is called the content of these mental states.19
That there is such a thing as mental content is not simply a grammatical
fact about how the words, “believe,” “desire,” and “intend” are used in the
English language. It is that, but it is also (and more deeply) a psychological
fact about the kinds of mental states these three states are. They are
representational states, states whose content represents the world (either
as we believe it is, want it to be, or intend to make it).
In differentiating explanations based on the mental states of historical
actors, it is thus not sufficient to characterize those states as being ones of
belief, desire, or intention. Suppose, for example, that one is satisfied that
18. For pretty standard treatments of what is often called “the folk psychology,” see
MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP (1984), ch. 1;
MOORE, MECHANICAL CHOICES, supra note 8, chs. 3–6.
19. See id.
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Austrian Foreign Minister Berchtold’s intentions in drafting the Austrian
ultimatum to Serbia were among the salient causes of World War I’s
crucial declarations of war. One still needs to know what intentions these
were: did Berchtold intend to start a war with Serbia, but Serbia only,
when he directed the drafting of the ultimatum by Baron Musilin? Or did
did Berchtold intend that a general European war result from his action of
sending such an ultimatum to Serbia? Or did Berchtold intend both a war
between Austria and Serbia, and a general European war, the former as
the means of accomplishing the latter? These are three different intentions
because they differ in their content.
Dwelling on the content of the mental states of belief, desire, and intention
has payoffs (for the construction of our matrix of kinds of explanations)
beyond this issue of individuation. Another payoff is to see that there are
two kinds of explanations that may explain an action by some historical
actor’s mental states of belief, desire, and intention. Vincent Van Gogh,
for example, famously took a knife and cut off his left ear. Suppose that
we are satisfied that his act of so wielding his knife was caused by Van
Gogh’s desire to be a great artist. Do we mean to use Van Gogh’s desire
as explaining his action in the way my desire to beat a famous chess master
might explain why my heart is racing, why I am sweating, or why I spill
my coffee in my state of excitement about our forthcoming chess match?20
Or do we mean to use Van Gogh’s desire as explaining his action as the
calculation of a rational agent, viz, where he believed that being earless
would reduce the distractions of those senses irrelevant to his art and thus
further his desire to be a great artist? The latter is what we usually mean
in historical explanation, recognizing that in odd-ball cases like Van Gogh’s
we might well mean the former.
To make out this “rationalizing relation”21 inherent in this second mode
of mental state explanations, there are subtle questions of what I shall call
questions of “fit” that must be answered. The central fit question is this:
how closely does the upshot actually achieved (say, being without an ear
in the case of Van Gogh) fit the content of the desire that motivated the
action having that upshot? For the desire to operate in a rationalizing explanation,
the fit needs to be pretty good; whereas for the first kind of explanation—

20. In MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY, supra note 18. I call these “mental cause”
explanations.
21. The terminology is Donald Davidson’s. See Actions, Reasons, and Causes, supra
note 11.
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where the mental state causes but does not rationalize the result—no fit at
all is required.
These questions of fit are more elusive than they may appear to be at
first glance. This is because the relation of fit is not identity but is rather,
instantiation. To see this, notice that the mental states of desiring that
some future state of affairs take place, or intending that it does so, or
foreseeing (predictively believing) that it will do so, all involve future
events that have not yet occurred at the time the mental state in question
is formed. When writing a history of such mental states, by contrast,
historians in the past tense seemingly refer to the particular events that
actually occurred and that are seemingly referred to in the content of such
mental states because, by the time the history is written, those events have
occurred and can thus be referred to as particulars. Thus, we might say
that Berchtold foresaw the outbreak of World War I as the upshot of his
ultimatum to Serbia, or alternatively, that he intended this. As put by such
historical, past tense statements, the description of the content of Berchtold’s
belief or intention, “the outbreak of World War I,” seemingly refers to the
actual sequence of events (the four major declarations of war) that
constituted in reality the outbreak of World War I. And therefore, one
might think, the question of fit becomes a question of identity, viz, was
the outbreak of World War I (referred to in the content of Berchtold’s mental
states) identical to the outbreak of World War I (the event that actually
occurred)? Yet this is a mistake—if Berchtold had the relevant intention
and/or the relevant predictive belief, he had no way of picking out the
exact nature of the event that had not yet happened (the starting of the War
at just the time and in just the way that it in fact started). So despite the
idiomatic English seemingly referring to that particular event when historians
speak in the past tense about Berchtold’s intentions and predictive beliefs,
in truth the content of those mental states is a representation of a type of
event, not a representation of some future particular event. Berchtold
intended (or foresaw), not the War; he intended (or foresaw) only a war.
More exactly, Berchtold intended (or foresaw) that some token of the type,
general European war, occur. Put even more formally, there is a hidden
existential quantifier nested within the content of future-oriented desires,
beliefs, and intentions, saying not that some discrete particular will occur but
only that there exists some particular that will occur that instantiates the
type of particular specified. Thus, when someone claims, “I predicted the
fire that occurred in the factory yesterday;” he is really claiming that he
predicted some event of the type, fire in that factory, would occur.22
22. For the logic of this (in now somewhat dated Quinean terms), see Michael S.
Moore, Foreseeing Harm Opaquely, in PLACING BLAME: A THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
363 (2010).
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The occurrence of the outbreak of World War I is a particular, an
event-token; the mental states given to explain it in history, while they
themselves are particulars, nonetheless have as their contents types of
events. The relationship of fit between an historical event like the outbreak
of World War I and the content of the mental states of historical actors
given to explain it, is thus a relation of instantiation, not identity.
Instantiation admits of degrees. It is sensible to ask: if Berchtold intended
some general European war ensure from his act of sending the ultimatum,
how clearly and how closely did the start of World War I in actuality
match the type of general European war that he had in mind? These matching
questions are matters of degree—surely if the representation of war in
Berchtold’s head had the order or dates of war declaration slightly different
than the reality of such matters, the fit is close enough to say that he
intended/foresaw “the War;” equally surely, if the representation of war
in Berchtold’s head was of a nuclear European war with a different alignment
of the belligerents at a much later date, the fit is not close enough to say
that he intended “The War.” And there is room for infinite gradations
between these poles of clear fit and clear not-fit.23
Let me digress briefly from the subject of developing an explanatory
taxonomy proper, to the moral implications evident in the taxonomy thus
far developed. Revert to my earlier example of my writing and your reading
of this essay, and the beliefs, desires, and intentions that both causes and
rationalize your action and mine. If reading this essay were a bad thing—
say, like starting a war—then these kinds of BDI, mental states explanations
would grade how morally culpable you were in doing what you did. As
the criminal law of almost all legal systems has recognized for centuries,
the worst folks are those who (in Aquinas’ words) “set their will” to some
evil like war, either as an end desired in itself or as a means intended to
fulfill some other end.24 The next most culpable are those who do what
they do not desiring or intending that which is bad or harmful in these
actions, but they foresee as a side effect of getting what they do desire and
23. These issues are related to, but are not the same as, the issues we explored in
part III above. There we were concerned with the size of the event referred to as “World
War I.” Here we are concerned with the representations of that event as the objects of the
desire, intentions, and beliefs of historical actors. Although related, these two questions
of individuation are distinct, for we do not individuate mental representations of events in
the same way or by the same criteria as we individuate the events themselves, either types
or tokens. See Michael S. Moore, Intentions and Mens Rea, in PLACING BLAME 449, supra
note 22.
24. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA.

569

MOORE2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

10/10/2022 2:30 PM

intend that (with variable degrees of likelihood) their actions will produce
the evil in question. And, finally, least culpable are those who neither
desire nor intend nor foresee that their actions will or might result in an
evil like a war, but they damn well should have foreseen how things would
turn out because any reasonable person would have predicted that.25
Also pertinent to the moral culpability of historical actors is the question
of the closeness of fit I explored a moment ago. The closer is the fit (between
the outbreak of World War I that actually occurred, and the representation of
that war in the head of the actors who intended or foresaw that War), the
more such actors bear the blameworthiness of ones who intended or
foresaw the war that their actions caused.26
For those interested in assigning blame to individuals for starting World
War I, both the taxonomy of explanation organized around the kind of
mental state involved, and the degree of fit between the content of the mental
state and the action it explains, will hold moral as well as explanatory interest.
B. Taxonomizing Explanations of Intentional Actions by the Kinds of
Relations Holding Between BDI Mental States and the
Actions That They Explain
The second dimension to my taxonomy of mental state explanations
will lie in the kind of relation(s) as may exist between the mental states27
of individuals on the one hand, and the thing to be explained, the outbreak
of the War, on the other. I earlier distinguished three kinds of relationships
—causal, counterfactual, and probabilistic—and I now want to build on
and to refine that taxonomy.

25. These well known gradations in culpability, as phrased in Anglo-American criminal
law, are described in MOORE, MECHANICAL CHOICES, supra note 8, ch. 4. There is a lively
dispute about the last of these being a true form of moral culpability. See Heidi M. Hurd
& Michael S. Moore, Punishing the Awkward, the Stupid, the Weak, and the Selfish: The
Culpability of Negligence, 5 CRIM . L. & P HIL. 147 (2011). The view that Professor Hurd
and I there defend urges that the blameworthiness of negligence is an aretaic kind of
blameworthiness (for bad character), not a deontic kind (for bad choices and bad actions);
but in what follows I ignore this subtlety.
26. See Michael Moore, Moore’s Truths About Causation and Responsibility: A Reply
to Alexander and Ferzan, 6 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 445 (2012).
27. More exactly, the relationship will be between one mental state/action pair, and
another mental state/action pair, the latter being the declarations of war. There are
interesting complexities about such pairs themselves, such as the relationship between an
intention to do some action A and the doing of A (usually one has to resort to a special,
non-generic kind of causal relation existing between the two.) But these complexities are
to the side of my interests here. What motivates the use of such mental state/action pairs is to
the fact that the declarations of war stand in the relations I shall chart in the text, not directly
to the mental states of certain actors but indirectly, through the actions immediately executed
by one otherwise accompanying those mental states.
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Consider any act other than the four historically salient acts of declaring
war and ask, what is the relation between the former act (and its accompanying
mental state) and the latter acts? The first possibility is that the former
caused the latter. The second possibility is that the latter counterfactually
depended on the former. The third possibility is that the latter probabilistically
depended on the former, i.e., that the former increased the conditional
probability of the latter.28 (These three relationships do not exclude one
another, so that more than one or even all three may exist in a given case.)
As to the first of these, the nature of the causal relationship that is the
subject matter of causal explanations is of course an enormous topic. Indeed,
I have myself killed more than a few trees exploring the question.29 From
that treatise-like treatment of causation, let me pick eight characteristics
that are here salient. First, there is a distinction between the singular causal
relation which relates tokens of events or states of affairs, one the one
hand, and causal laws that relate types of events or states of affairs, on the
other. Second, every singular causal statement presupposes that there are
one or more causal laws (even though, contra Hume and his followers,
singular causal statements are not to be reduced to statements of causal
laws). On a deductive-nomological understanding as to the character of
such laws, that means that singular causes “make” their effects happen in
the sense that singular causes, together with other factors, are sufficient
for their effects. Third, neither the singular causal relationship between
tokens of events or states of affairs, nor the relationship of causal laws
connecting types of events or states of affairs, is to be identified with either
relations of counterfactual dependency (or to laws of such dependencies) or to
relations of probabilistic dependency (or to probabilistic laws). Fourth,
while I have argued for the primacy of states of affairs (states of affairs
are the having of a property by an object over a temporal duration) over
events as the relata of the singular causal relation,30 nothing turns on that
here, save the implication that it is idiomatic to speak of either as causes
and effects and that no restriction to one or the other (say, to events like
sparks) is defensible. Fifth, there can be no singular causal relations between
absences of either events or states of affairs because an absence is no kind
28. I shall ignore David Lewis’ subtle distinction between conditional probability
statements and conditional statements of probability. See Lewis, Postscripts to Causation,
in his 2 PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 178 (1986).
29. Michael Moore, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN LAW, MORALS,
AND METAPHYSICS (2009).
30. Id. at chs. 14–15.
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of particular but is rather only a negative existentially generalized statement
that nothing of a certain type exists; this implies three things, each of them
rather significant: (a) an omission to prevent some event or state of affairs
is not a cause (even though the event or state of affairs in question may
counterfactually depend on the absence); (b) an act or other event that is
said to prevent the occurrence of something is not the cause of that
something because that “something” is an absence that doesn’t exist, so
preventions, like omissions, are not what they are by virtue of being causal
in nature; (c) acts that prevent other acts or events from themselves
preventing the occurrence of some event or state of affairs (so called
“double preventions”) also are not causal in nature. Sixth, the causes of
any event or state of affairs are typically (and perhaps always) multiple,
so that there are numerous causes for all historical events or states of
affairs (such as declarations of war).31 Seventh, causation is a scalar relation,
in the sense that something can be more-or-less a cause as a matter of
degree; further, not all causes are created equal, so that the degrees of
causal contribution to some outcome by one factor can be greater or lesser
than the causal contribution to that same outcome by another factor (and
will be, in that sense, “more important” in causally explaining the phenomenon).
Eighth and finally, the degree of causal contribution of some factor can be
so small as to be de minimus, making it in popular parlance not a cause
(and thus, not causally explanatory) at all; such de minimus factors, however,
if they are necessary to the occurrence of some event (think of the
proverbial flapping of a butterfly’s wings in the Sahara and a hurricane
months later in Florida) may explain the latter event via the relation of
counterfactual dependence even if not via the relation of causation.
The second relation, that of counterfactual dependence, has generated
almost as much literature and diversity of opinion as has causation.32 Salient
here, however, are the following points. First, counterfactual statements
relate only possible (rather than actual) events or states of affairs. That is,
such statements imagine what Leibnitz called “possible worlds” and relate
events in that world, one to the other. For example, suppose we say:
“If Princeps had not killed Franz Ferdinand, World War I would not have
happened.” Such statements describe a world that is only possible and not
actual because in that world there was no assassination of the Arch-Duke,
and in that world there was no World War I.33 Second, because there

31. See supra note 4.
32. The two generations of literature in philosophy on counterfactuals are begun
by NELSON GOODMAN, FACT, FICTION, AND FORECAST (4th ed. 1983), and DAVID LEWIS,
COUNTERFACTUALS (1973).
33. For a fascinating, detailed description of four such possible worlds, see
RICHARD NED LEBOW, ARCHDUKE FRANZ FERDINAND LIVES! A WORLD WITHOUT WORLD
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are innumerable possible worlds, on the current scheme for counterfactuals
derived from the work of David Lewis (and Robert Stalnaker34), one tests the
truth of counterfactual statements in a possible world that is closest to the
actual world, save that in that possible world the event that did happen in
the actual world did not happen in that close possible world. 35 Third,
counterfactual dependence (unlike causation) relates absences as well as
presences. This means that in the three kinds of cases above discussed
—omissions to prevent, preventions, and double-preventions—it is the
relation of counterfactual dependence and not causation that forms the
basis of explanations framed in terms of these three notions.36 Fourth, the
relation of counterfactual dependence, like the relation of causation, is
WAR I (2014). There is an interesting difference in the focus of historians versus philosophers
on counterfactuals. Each of the four possible worlds Lebow examines in his book are the
same for the philosophical question of what possible world is close enough to the actual
world for it to be a test of the counterfactual in the actual world. For in each scenario,
Franz Ferdinand does not get killed, and World War I doesn’t happen. What interests
historians is what happens in such possible worlds after the non-occurrence of World War
I, which is at it should be because that informs us of the significance of the assassination.
But for technical reasons, what happens after World War I does not happen cannot enter
into the closeness calculation needed to ascertain the truth of the counterfactual, “If Franz
Ferdinand had not been killed, then World War I would not have happened.” See MOORE,
CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY 389, supra note 29.
34. Robert Stalnaker, A Theory of Conditionals, in STUDIES IN LOGICAL THEORY (N.
Rescher ed., 1968).
35. This scheme sounds simpler than in fact it is. As Lewis was at such pains to
point out, when one constructs a possible world where an event that happened in the actual
world is not present in that possible world, other things also have to change besides the
removal of the event in question: either the laws connecting that event to other events,
and/or those other events themselves. Lewis thus invents a complicated similarity metric
for measuring the closeness of possible worlds in terms of major versus minor “miracles”
(i.e., breaches of true scientific laws) or in terms of numbers other events changed besides
that stipulated to be changed by the antecedent clause of the relevant counterfactual. See
David Lewis, Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow, 13 NOUS 455 (1979).
36. This oversimplified a bit. The counterfactual dependency relation in cases of
prevention and double prevention itself depends on there being some causal relationship
(although not a causal relationship to the event being explained.) E.g., if Sazonov
prevented the Tsar from ordering the cessation of Russian mobilization on July 30, then
Sazonov’s action of talking to the Tsar caused something—not the absence of a cessation
order by the Tsar, but a state of mind in the Tsar (such as the Tsar’s belief that demobilization
was no longer possible) which state of mind was inconsistent with (could not co -exist
with) both the Tsar intending to order demobilization and the Tsar’s actually ordering
demobilization. Nonetheless, despite the necessary existence of such a causal relationship
in relations of prevention and of double prevention, it remains true that only the relation
of counterfactual dependence exists between Sazonov’s action and two absences: the lack
of an intention to order, and the lack of an ordering of, demobilization by the Tsar.
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scalar, again in the sense that it admits of degrees of strength. Although
it is not very idiomatic in ordinary English,37 one thing can be more necessary
than another thing, to the happening of some third event. This scalar nature
to counterfactual dependency stems from the scalar nature of the degrees
of closeness of the possible worlds in which one tests counterfactual
statements for their truth: necessity is stronger the further (“less close”)
are the possible worlds in which a counterfactual statement remains true.
For example: if in the absence of Germany’s “blank check” Austria would
not have issued its unacceptable ultimatum to Serbia, and if this would be
true despite virtually any other changes in the world (such as, e.g., Russia
being less vehemently pan-Slavic), then Germany’s blank check was strongly
necessary to Austria’s issuance of its war-provoking ultimatum. Or take
another example, one much debated by historians:38 if the counterfactual,
“if Franz Ferdinand had not been assassinated, then World War I would not
have happened,” remains true in worlds quite distant from the actual
world, then the assassination was strongly necessary to the happening of
World War I. On the other hand, if something else would have sparked
the War if the assassination had not, then the assassination was only weakly
necessary to the happening of the War.39
I understand causation and counterfactual dependence to be ontologically
basic relations, in the sense that they are not to be identified with each
other nor with some third kind of relation. Yet in combination they do
produce a non-basic (or “constructed”) relation that is of considerable interest
to historical explanations. This is the relation of inevitability. What do
we mean when we say things like, “Once Austria invaded Serbia World
War I became inevitable?” I think we mean two things: (1) In combination
with other factors already in place on July 29, 1914, the Austrian invasion
of Belgrade on that day was sufficient for World War I to become a reality
over the next six days; and (2) There was no human action that could have
37. Although consider this bit of seemingly idiomatic English by Chief Justice John
Marshall, who when discussing what Congressional powers were “necessary and proper”
under the U.S. Constitution in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819), had this to say
about the ordinary meaning of “necessary:” “The word ‘necessary’. . . admits of all degrees
of comparison . . . A thing may be necessary, very necessary, absolutely or indispensably
necessary.”
38. See, e.g., JACK BEATTY, THE LOST HISTORY OF 1914: RECONSIDERING THE YEAR
THE GREAT WAR BEGAN 194–200 (2012) (defending the view (although not in these terms)
that the assassination of Franz Ferdinand was strongly necessary to the occurrence of
World War I.).
39. The view, for example, of the British historian F.H. Hinsley: “If the Sarajevo
crisis had not precipitated a particular great war, some other crisis would have precipitated
a great war at no distant time.” Hinsley is so quoted in Richard Ned Lebow, Franz Ferdinand
Found Alive: World War I Unnecessary, in UNMAKING THE WEST: COUNTERFACTUAL THOUGHT
EXPERIMENTS IN HISTORY (Philip Tetlock et al eds., 2006).
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been taken after that date that would have prevented that outbreak of the
War. Statement (1) is of course the causal law implication of the singular
causal statement that the Austrian invasion of Serbia caused World War
I; statement (2) is a statement of counterfactual dependence, namely, the
denial of there being such dependence of World War I on the absence of any
post July 29 human action whatsoever.40
Inevitability is a slippery notion. One might think that causes, insofar
as they give sufficient conditions for the happening of the War, already
make that War inevitable. After all, if factors X, Y, and Z are jointly
sufficient for the War, that means that no other factor—human omissions
of trying to prevent it included—were necessary. Sufficiency might seem
to betoken inevitability, all by itself. Yet this is a mistake. Sufficiency is
a highly context-sensitive notion. In this it is like the notion of similarity.
One can sensibly judge one thing to be similar to another only when one
specifies the respect(s) in which the comparison is to be made. Similarly,
one can judge one factor to be sufficient for another only when one specifies
the range of items being said to be not necessary. To say that X, Y, and Z
were jointly sufficient for W is to say that nothing else like them (in certain
relevant respects) was needed for W to happen.
The reason for this context-sensitivity is the same for sufficiency as it
is for similarity: both are otherwise empty of distinguishing power if the
context does not supply the respects in which one is to judge similarity or
sufficiency. For, as I remarked earlier, everything is similar to everything
else in some respect, dissimiliar to everything else in some other respect.
Likewise, no set of factors (short of a total state description of the universe)
is sufficient for some event or state of affairs (W) if no boundaries are
imposed on the class of factors alleged to be not necessary. To use a pertinent
example, the combination of the intentions to declare war of the leaders
of Austria, Russia, Germany, France, and Great Britain were not sufficient
for the War to occur if one must take account of factors like the presence
of oxygen in earth’s atmosphere, the existence of gravity, the absence of
a Martian invasion, etc., for all of these were surely necessary for the
outbreak of the War, meaning that the intentions were not sufficient.
So when we say things like, “Austria’s invasion of Serbia caused World
War I,” the fact that we imply that that invasion (in combination with

40. Equivalently but more idiomatically for the counterfactual involved in statement (2):
If any action within the realm of actions possible for the Kaiser and others after July 29
had been taken, such action would not have prevented World War I.
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certain other factors) was sufficient for the War, we do not mean that the
War was inevitable. The War became inevitable (because of facts like
Austria’s invasion of Serbia) only if that invasion was sufficient in a very
special sense of “sufficient,” viz, the sense that asserts that all omissions
of an attempt at preventing the War were not necessary. It is only this
special sense of sufficiency—a sense not generated by simply asserting
causation—that yields the counterfactual needed for true inevitability (the
counterfactual is: had any attempt been made to prevent the War, it would
have been unsuccessful, i.e., the War would have occurred anyway).41
The upshot of this discussion is that to claim that some factor X caused
the War, or to say that the War counterfactually depended on X, is not to
say that X, when it occurred, made the War inevitable. Far from it. Many
human choices were made not to stop the diplomatic and military chain
reactions occurring in Europe June 28–August 4, 1914, and had those
choices been made the other way many of them would have prevented the
War. The War was not inevitable (in the sense that I have just analyzed)
unless and until no human choice/action pair could have stopped it.42
The nature of the third basic relation43 out of which historical explanations
are built, probabilistic dependence, is also a matter that has been extensively
41. The sense of “inevitability” just analyzed is confined to a human-centric perspective;
things are inevitable in this sense only when there is nothing human beings can do to stop
it. But there is a more general sense of “inevitability” that is to be used where one’s interest
is not about whether human actors could have prevented it. Thus, we might say that the
destruction of a town by avalanche was inevitable and mean by that only that “it was going
to happen sooner or later.” Overdetermination cases are the clearest examples of such usage: if
this avalanche from this mountain had not destroyed the town, the next avalanche following the
first would have destroyed the town; as some Arabs would say of such cases, “so it was
written then.”
42. Some “hard determinists” (William James’s term) would have us believe that
those choices could not have been made differently than they were because those choices
too were sufficiently caused by earlier factors over which the relevant actors had no control.
And further: whatever those choices in turn caused (the War) was therefore inevitable once
the causes of those choices had occurred. Yet the hard determinist makes the mistake of
assuming that his is the only reading of, “could have chosen otherwise.” On the compatibilist
reading of the principle of alternative possibilities that I defend, the Kaiser and other actors
could have chosen other than they did even though their choices were sufficiently caused
by factors themselves unchosen. See Moore, Compatibilism(s) for Neuroscientists, in LAW
AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION (Enrique Villanueva, ed., 2014) (revised and reprinted in
MOORE, MECHANICAL CHOICES, supra note 8).
43. It is a contested matter whether probabilistic dependence is a basic relation, or
whether it is instead merely an epistemic derivation of causation and counterfactual dependence.
Modern micro-physics strongly suggests that there is a primitive relation of probabilistic
dependence but that does not settle the issue for historians; for however objectivist the
physics comes out about probability, there is plainly another sense of probability that
is epistemic and derived from causal and counterfactual notions, and it is possible that it
is only that epistemic, derived sense that historians intend when they speak of chance raisings in history.
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explored. While there is considerable long-term agreement on the validity
of the Kolmogorov axions of probability and the theorems that follow
from them, there is much less consensus on the semantics of the crucial
terms (such as “chance”) in these axioms and their theorems (it is their
semantics that tells us what the relation of probability is that is said to be
raised in conditional probability statements). Is chance a primitive propensity,
a relative frequency, a subjective estimation, etc.?44 Prescinding away from
these contested matters, the salient features of probabilistic dependence
relevant here are two. First, like counterfactual dependence but unlike
causation, probabilistic dependence can relate absences. Second, the relation
is even more obviously scalar than is causation and counterfactual dependence:
one event can raise the probability of another event more or less than can
some third event, even though that third event is also a probability-raiser.
Like the first dimension used to develop a taxonomy of kinds of explanations
(in terms of kinds of mental states), this second dimension is not without
moral as well as explanatory interest. For as a crude generalization, people
whose actions cause something bad (like a horrible war) are more blameworthy
with respect to that bad thing than are those whose actions are only
counterfactually necessary for that bad thing to occur (as by, say, failing
to prevent it); and both are more blameworthy than those whose actions
only make the bad thing more likely. As with mental state-based gradations
of culpability earlier discussed, these relation -based gradations of
blameworthiness are reflected throughout Western criminal codes; for
these codes punish acts that cause some bad thing more than either failures
to prevent that thing from occurring (omissions) or actions that prevent a
would-be preventer from preventing that thing from occurring (double
preventions).45 And those who only raise the chance of others causing that
bad result, are usually relegated to the lesser blameworthiness of accomplices
(enablers) rather than principals (causers) even when the bad thing actually
occurs.46 So that again, as with the first dimension, those interested in

44. A well known exploration of the various objective and subjective possibilities
for such a semantics for probability statements is DONALD GILLIES, PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES
OF PROBABILITY (2000).
45. See MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 29, ch. 18.
46. Such generalizations about degrees of blameworthiness are said to be “crude”
in the text because of the scalarity of each of the three relations, and the proportionate
scalarity in the moral blameworthiness attached to each such scalar relation. Being more
strongly causal, more necessary, or more raising of conditional probability, each makes
for being more blameworthy. This leaves open the possibility, often enough realized, that

577

MOORE2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

10/10/2022 2:30 PM

questions of moral responsibility for World War I should have an independent
moral interest in this second dimension of my taxonomy in addition to their
presumed explanatory interest.
VI. APPLYING THE TAXONOMY OF KINDS OF EXPLANATIONS TO
“THE BOTTLENECK” CONSTITUTED BY THE EVENTS OF
JUNE 28–AUGUST 4, 1914
In this part I seek to apply the taxonomy of kinds of explanations to the
actions explanatory of the War that were outlined in Part V above. Rather
than following the chronology depicted in the timeline in Part IV as the
organizing principle for this discussion, I shall rather organize this discussion
by the categories of explanation distinguished in Part V above. My main
criterion of distinction will be by the kinds of mental states involved (the
first dimension of that taxonomy), and then secondarily by the kind of
explanatory relation involved (the second dimension). Because of the
heightened moral interest in such cases, I will begin with actions of those
actors who intended the war, starting with those who may have intended
the War as an end in itself (the object of a motivating desire) rather than
as a means intended to secure some further end.
A. The Mental States of Those Whose Actions in Some Way (Causally,
Counterfactually, or Probabilistically) Explain the War
1. Actions by Those Intending the War for Its Own Sake
Which actions and actors are within this category is of course a central
bone of contention of those who wish to adjudicate the question of war
guilt with respect to World War I. But it is also a central question of
explanatory interest, because a straightforward explanation of the War is
that such a war was precisely what was wanted and intended by those with
the power to cause it. In this section I shall begin with those who desired the
war for its own sake, as an end-in-itself, and not merely as a means to the
attainment of some other end.47
a strongly necessary action may be more blameworthy for something like the War than an
only weakly causally efficacious action.
47. There are some issues lurking here in distinguishing those who desire a state of
affairs for its own sake and those who intend that state of affairs as a means to obtain some
further end. Suppose a statesman was motivated to his war-causing activities by the belief
that wars exemplify the proper development of male virtue and for that reason intended to
start a general European War—is that to desire war as an end in itself? I so classify it
because the relationship said to exist between the War starting and the further thing that is
thusly achieved—the attainment of the supposed virtue attaching to being in such a war—
is non-causal. True enough, being in the War possesses (it is thought by such a person)
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The psychology I have in mind here is well exemplified by Theodore
Roosevelt. Roosevelt was a believer in the virtuous nature of war. As he
said in his 1897 speech to the American Naval War College:
“No triumph of peace is quite so great as the supreme triumphs of war . . . the
minute that a race loses the hard fighting virtues, then . . . it has lost its proud
right to stand as the equal of the best.”48

Roosevelt’s connection of the manly virtues to war extended to individual
behavior, and not just states (or Roosevelt’s “races”). As a perspicuous
biographer of Roosevelt wrote, “Roosevelt yearned for conflict—for the
ultimate conflict of war. . . . In his more bellicose moods it sometimes
seemed that just about any war would do.”49
Roosevelt meant what he said, for his actions matched his words. Rather
than directing the Spanish-American War from the safety of Washington
D.C. as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Roosevelt famously volunteered
to form and lead (to be sure, under the professional guidance of a real
soldier, Col. Leonard Wood) his famous Rough Riders. 50 Part of his
motivation for this was his openly expressed desire to personally kill an
enemy soldier during military combat, a desire he fulfilled in his charge
up San Juan Hill in 1898. Even the horrors of World War I and the death
of his youngest (and perhaps dearest) son, Quentin, near the end of the
War, did not dissuade Roosevelt from this view. Despite openly sobbing
over Quentin’s death shortly before his own, Roosevelt said it was better
that Quentin had died doing his manly duty than that he lived shirking it.
Roosevelt is here of interest mainly by way of illustration of the
psychology in question (namely, desiring war as an end in itself). For
Roosevelt was not one of the principal actors whose decisions directly
brought on the War. True enough, Roosevelt met with Kaiser Wilhelm II
at Edward VII’s funeral in London in 1910, and was Wilhelm’s guest to
this desirability characteristic, but this fact does not refer to a further event caused by the
War that could then serve as its further end. What makes an end desirable (its “desirability
characteristic”) is not itself some further event to which the end is a mere means but is
only a property possessed by the end. See A.J. Watt, The Intelligibility of Wants, 81 MIND
553 (1972); MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY, supra note 18, at 19.
48. Quoted in CARTER, GEORGE, NICHOLAS, AND WILHELM, supra note 2, at 216. A
contemporary of Roosevelt’s, William James, characterized this view of Roosevelt’s thusly:
“Roosevelt believes in war as an ideal function, necessary from time to time for national
health.” THOMAS, THE WAR LOVERS, supra note 17, at 90.
49. THOMAS, THE WAR LOVERS, supra note 17, at 59.
50. A bit of volunteering he was to repeat once America entered the War in his offer
to President Wilson to form a troop to be sent abroad.
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observe German war games shortly thereafter; and it may well be true that
Roosevelt’s “war-as-manly-virtue” view influenced the Kaiser to some
imitation of that view. Also true enough, Roosevelt’s persistent public criticisms
of President Wilson’s keeping America out of the War in its early years may
have aided in precipitating America’s eventual involvement in 1917.51
But despite this, Roosevelt’s view that wars are desirable for both individuals
and states had little direct impact on the outbreak of World War I.
Were any of the actions by those actors who did have a larger and more
direct impact, motivated by a desire for the War for its own sake, as a state
of affairs that was intrinsically desirable? If one were to believe the
propaganda issued by the Allies both during and shortly after the War, the
leading candidate would be the Kaiser, Wilhelm II; for such Allied ( and
particularly British) propaganda depicted the Kaiser as the chief villain of
the War, an evil war-monger who valued war for its own sake. 52 More
specifically, the Kaiser was widely seen as one of those stereotypical Prussian
militarists for whom war was as desirable as it was inevitable in the Darwinian
struggle between peoples.
Certainly some of the Kaiser’s public pronouncements made understandable
this war-loving interpretation of his motivations. One of the best known
of these—well known because so widely picked up in the international
press at the time it was made and because it was so much used in later
British wartime propaganda—was the Kaiser’s 1900 “Hun speech.” The
Kaiser addressed departing German soldiers on the docks at Bremerhaven
Harbor as they set off to suppress the Boxer Rebellion in China. Wilhelm
told his soldiers to show “no mercy” to the Chinese rebels, to take no
prisoners, to imitate “the Huns one thousand years ago [who] made a name
for themselves to which their greatness still resounds. . .”53

51. Roosevelt initially expressed sympathy for the German use of Belgium as an
invasion route to France, a sympathy formed as a result of personal correspondence to him
by the Kaiser on the subject. Roosevelt’s sympathy here was short-lived, however;
replaced by Roosevelt’s fervent desire for America (and him personally) to take on the
Germans. Years before Roosevelt had speculated that American troops would put on a
good showing against the more militaristic Germans—as early as 1889 Roosevelt wrote
to a friend that he did not “know that I should be sorry to see a bit of a spar with Germany”
and that “while we would have to take some awful blows at first, I think in the end we
would worry the Kaiser a little.” THOMAS , THE W AR LOVERS, supra note 17, at 59.
Roosevelt seemingly never lost that desire for such a test of American “virtue.”
52. This view of the Kaiser is described briefly in John C.G. Rohl, The Curious
Case of the Kaiser’s Disappearing War Guilt, in AN IMPROBABLE WAR: THE OUTBREAK
OF WORLD WAR I AND EUROPEAN POLITICAL CULTURE BEFORE 1914 75–76 (Holger Afflebach
& David Stevenson, eds., 2007). See also CHRISTOPHER CLARK, KAISER WILHELM II: LIFE
AND POWER 359–60 (2009).
53. Speech at Bremerhaven Harbor, July 27, 1900, reported in CLARK, KAISER WILHELM
II, supra note 52, at 234.
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Yet in truth this image of a “Supreme Warlord” (the title Wilhelm gave
himself around 1900 and proudly kept until Hindenburg appropriated it
for himself late in the War) was just that, an image. Wilhelm had an image
in mind as to what a Kaiser of the German Empire and a King of militaristic
Prussia should look like, and his bellicose, threatening, war-welcoming
image was just his playing out of the script he thought he was obligated
by his role and his heritage to follow. Contrary to such an image, Wilhelm
was a vain, weak, often depressed, insecure, physically handicapped, 54
image-conscious man who was out of his depth in the offices that he held
and the power that he wielded in Germany’s only half-democratic system
of government. He vacillated in his opinions, his views at any given
moment often depending on whoever it was with whom he last spoke. He
was impetuous in his decision-making, and was typically more concerned
with how he looked in making decisions than he was in making the right
decision. He also was jealous of his prerogatives, once making his uncle,
then Prince of Wales and only later King and Emperor Edward VII, cool
his heels in Vienna while his nephew (Wilhelm), already an Emperor, preempted that uncle’s visit with Emperor Franz Josef. And, in light of his
vanity so extending to his personal appearance, he was a lover of uniforms,
particularly military uniforms of other nations as well as of Germany.
As to the subject of war itself, Wilhelm saw military prowess as part of
his role. He participated in the annual army war games, vainly enough
that he did not detect his generals’ annoyance nor their connivance in letting
him do better than his talents would otherwise have produced. It is not
clear whether his personal courage was ever tested in battle as it was for
Roosevelt. But he was not oblivious to the obvious risks of war for his
empire, drawing back from aggressive moves often enough that he was
derisively tagged, “the Peace Kaiser” by some German military officials,
some of whom even contemplated swapping such a “pacifist” for the more
aggressive Crown Prince Ruprecht, Wilhelm’s eldest son. Still, Wilhelm
was always Bismarck’s pupil (even after the pupil dropped the old master
as Chancellor) in that war was seen as an instrument of national policy
equally legitimate with peaceful alternatives such as diplomacy and economic
hegemony.

54. Wilhelm had an atrophied left arm, a disfigurement that he saw as undercutting
his masculine deportment and that he went to ridiculous lengths to disguise (with customized
uniforms and carefully calculated camera poses).
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So how should we characterize the state(s) of mind with which Wilhelm
acted between July 5 and August 4 of 1914? What Wilhelm did or omitted
to do we have already charted in Part IV. To summarize: he gave the Austrians
their blank check on July 5; from July 5 to July 23 he continuously indicated
support for Austria’s desire to punish Serbia by military action (although
when he heard the contents of the July 25 Serbian response to the Austrian
ultimatum he thought it to be so conciliatory on Serbia’s part that no such
military action would need to be taken by Austria, and when such action
was taken anyway on July 29, he on that same day authorized his Chancellor
to urge the Austrians to stop their invasion of Serbia with the occupation
of Belgrade); on or before July 26 he authorized his brother Heinrich to
visit King George to sound out the British King about Britain’s possible
neutrality; between July 28 and August 1 he engaged in the extensive telegraph
exchanges with Tsar Nicholas (the Nicky-Willy Correspondence) that
generally urged Russian restraint on mobilization; on July 31 he consented
to Germany’s declaration of danger of imminent war, and on August 1 he
ordered general mobilization of the German army, followed shortly thereafter
by his signing of Germany’s declaration of war against Russia, and on the
same day authorized the ultimatum to the French to surrender their forts
in exchange for not being attacked; on the evening of August 1 he ordered
his armies not to attack France, but rescinded the order that same night;
on August 2 he authorized the sending of the ultimatum to Belgium, and
on August 3 he signed Germany’s declaration of war against France; on
August 4 he intentionally omitted to order a halt to the German advance
already underway in Belgium, the order demanded by the British ultimatum
of that date on pain of war being declared by Britain against Germany.
This is a lot of intentional action by the Kaiser, over an extended period
of time. Given the vacillating nature of the Kaiser’s mind, it is unlikely
that we can isolate a consistent mental state (about the desirability or inevitability
of a general European war) with which all of these actions were taken.
Still, one common thread seems clear: at no point did the Kaiser think that
a general European war was desirable for its own sake. He was never, in
other words, motivated to his war-causing actions or omissions by setting
his will towards such a war as an end in itself. He may have pretended to
such a bellicosity at times; he may have wanted to look like a ruler who
reveled in war like the Teutonic knights of legend; but the psychological
reality was quite different.
A better candidate for a real admirer of war for its own sake was the
still relatively young (just approaching 40 as the War broke out) Winston
Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty and doubtlessly the most vociferous
war hawk in Asquith’s Liberal Cabinet. Along with Edward Grey but not
within the ken of most of the rest of the Liberal Cabinet, Churchill knew
of the 1912 naval convention with the French that allowed the Royal Navy
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to concentrate its modern battleships in the North Sea because the French
would concentrate theirs in the Mediterranean, with the implicit understanding
that in the event of war between France and Germany Britain would not
allow the German High Seas fleet to bombard the channel coast of France.
(This understanding, and the French reliance upon it, figured greatly in
motivating Grey to put Britain into the War as soon as France was engaged.)
Churchill also readied the Royal Navy for combat as early as July 26, as
we have seen, putting it at its war-time station ahead of the mobilization
of either the German or the French fleets; in light of the uncertain status
of Turkey in the alignment of combatants at the outset of the War, Churchill
also at this time (well before Turkey had declared for Germany) cancelled
the Turkish contracts for the construction of two new dreadnoughts in
British shipyards, transferring the almost completed battleships to the Royal
Navy instead.55
On July 28, after the Austrians had declared war on Serbia and after
Churchill had ordered the Grand Fleet to its war station at Scapa Flow,
Winston visited King George to inform him (in the King’s words) that
“Winston Churchill came to see me [to tell me that] the Navy is all ready
for War, but please God it will not come.”56 By July 28 when he visited
the King, and then between July 28 and August 4, plainly Churchill believed
that a general European war was imminent and that his actions would help
propel Britain into it. During this period, did he also intend his actions to
help bring on the War? Did he so intend because he wanted such a war
for its own sake, as an end in itself? The latter question is the relevant one
for this subsection.
Like Teddy Roosevelt, Churchill as a young man relished the prospect
of personal combat in wartime. Every study of Churchill’s life details
(mostly via his letters to his mother, the famous Lady Randolph Churchill
nee Jenny Jerome) his efforts to place himself in the harm’s way of
personal combat during his 20’s.57 This was true of his insertion of himself
(when he was but 21) into the Spanish attempt to put down the rebellion
in Cuba in 1895; it was also true of Churchill’s even more aggressively
inserting himself on three other occasions while still in his 20’s where
55. One of the battleships was so near completion that its Turkish crew was already
standing by in England to take possession of it.
56. CARTER, GEORGE, NICHOLAS, AND WILHELM, supra note 2, at 366.
57. A brief but highly readable account of this part of Churchill’s life is that done
by his granddaughter, Celia Sandys. CELIA SANDYS, CHURCHILL: WANTED DEAD OR ALIVE
(1999).
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combat beckoned somewhere in the British Empire even though his own
regiment, the 4th Hussars, was never involved in such fields of operations:
on the Northwest frontier of India where in 1897 Churchill joined the
Malakand Field Force in its suppression of Pathan rebels; in 1898 in
Kitchener’s expedition against the Dervishes in the Sudan (and very much
against Kitchener’s wishes, Prime Minister Salisbury having interceded
to induce Kitchener to change his mind about having what Kitchener regarded
as an ambitious “medal-hunter” on his expedition); and most famously of
all, in Churchill’s 1899 taking himself to the Boer war in South Africa,
where he was captured by the Boers but escaped.
One might well say of this younger Churchill what I earlier quoted from
one of Teddy Roosevelt’s biographers about Roosevelt: “In his more
bellicose moods, it sometimes seemed that almost any war would do.”58
Moreover, like Roosevelt, Winston both wanted the thrill of being shot at
and the accomplishment of shooting and killing someone in combat. As
to the former: Winston was nearly killed in Cuba, a Cuban rebel bullet
narrowly missing his head by less than a foot; in covering a retreat in Northwest
India both of his immediate companions were killed by Pathan bullets,
Churchill admitting to his mother that “here I was perhaps very near my
end;”59 in the Sudan Churchill was in the thick of the famous charge of
the 21st Lancers at Omdurman60 against the Dervish (often said to be the
last great cavalry charge of the British Army before machine guns rendered
such heroics ridiculous folly), where Churchill saved himself from upraised
Dervish swords only by pistol work at very close range (three yards in one
case, pistol muzzle against his opponent’s body in the other). 61 His
granddaughter’s conclusion from all this? “There is no doubt that he
enjoyed the danger.”62 In the young Churchill’s own words, “Nothing in
life is so exhilarating as to be shot at without result.”63 As to the latter:
while there is no record that he killed anyone in Cuba, in the Northwest
India campaign (as he bragged to his mother), he shot five Pathan rebels,64
58. THOMAS, THE WAR LOVERS, supra note 17, at 59.
59. SANDYS, CHURCHILL, supra note 57, at 6.
60. A charge that confirmed Kitchener’s disdain for medal-hunters like Churchill,
Kitchener being annoyed at the combination of lack of reason or results to the charge, and
the glory given it in the press nonetheless. See JOHN POLLOCK, KITCHENER 132 (2001).
61. Many of Churchill’s companions in the charge were not so lucky; the Lancers
suffered 51 casualties out of a complement of just over 300. ROY JENKINS, CHURCHILL: A
BIOGRAPHY 41 (2002).
62. SANDYS, CHURCHILL, supra note 57, at 6.
63. WINSTON CHURCHILL, THE STORY OF THE MALAKAND FIELD FORCE 172 (1898).
64. Churchill’s description: “I . . . fired my revolver at a man at 30 yards . . . Later
on I used a rifle which a wounded man had dropped and fired 40 rounds at close quarters.
I cannot be certain but I think I hit four men. At any rate, they fell. . . .” SANDYS, CHURCHILL,
supra note 57, at 6.
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and in the Sudan Churchill bragged about his personal bag in the famous
charge as consisting of having killed “several—3 for certain—2 doubtful.”65
Despite Churchill’s rather remarkable enthusiasm for war in his youth,
it would be a mistake to characterize him as one who subscribed to the
true war-lover’s ideology that combat was essential both for personal
manly virtue and for a state’s rightful place amongst worthy nations. For
Churchill’s youthful desire for combat was almost exclusively a function
of his political ambitions. Responding to his father’s admonition about
him, expressed to him in unmistakable terms—“you are not bright enough
to take up either law or politics so you should aim at a military career”—
the young Churchill saw success in the military as his stepping stone to
entering politics, and he gauged such military success (as Lord Kitchener
so plainly saw) in terms of medals and getting mentioned in dispatches for
courageous accomplishments; that was his impetus to combat, not some
belief that it was incumbent on any well formed man to take up arms.
Moreover, however much Churchill may have reveled in exposing himself
to personal danger and in his ability to fight his way clear of such danger,66
his later views on combat as a matter of state policy seem disconnected
from any such risk-loving enthusiasms as may have survived his youth.
Unlike Roosevelt, Churchill’s enthusiasm for his own personal participation
in combat did not carry over to some judgment of the desirability of
combat for the health of the state; unlike the Roosevelt who volunteered
for a personal role in combat in both 1898 and again in 1917, Churchill did
not give up his control of the making of war policy for the personal making
of war.67
Churchill’s decisions that contributed to Britain’s entry into the War in
1914 were seemingly motivated by matters of policy. As he was to write after

65. Quoted in JENKINS, CHURCHILL, supra note 61, at 41.
66. Even the fully mature Churchill never completely lost some of these characteristics
of his youth. Witness the 66 year old Churchill arming his automobile with a Bren light
machine gun in the trunk, and arming his person with a pistol, both during the Blitz in
1940: Churchill explained such actions with the grim thought that he personally could kill
at least one or two Germans before they killed him in the expected German invasion of
England. ERIK LARSON, THE SPLENDID AND THE VILE: A SAGA OF CHURCHILL, FAMILY,
AND DEFIANCE DURING THE BLITZ 45 (2020).
67. At least Churchill did not give up such control willingly; after the disaster of
Gallipoli was put on Churchill’s shoulders and he was accordingly forced from his position
as First Lord of the Admiralty, he did then join British troops in combat in Belgium for a
time (but only until he secured a consolatory policy-making position as Minister of Munitions
for the rest of the War).
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the War, “That the cause was good, that the argument was overwhelming,
that the response would be worthy, I did not for a moment doubt.” 68
Somewhere in his four volume recollections of the War one might have
thought that the “overwhelming goodness and worthiness” of the arguments
that moved Churchill to war in 1914 would have been laid out by one who
was, after all, one of the prime movers of the British towards war. But
such arguments make little or no appearance because by 1914 the matter
was settled in Churchill’s mind: of course Britain would have to join France
in any war not of her own making with Germany. The honor of Britain would
demand it. While the literal agreements of the Entente did not commit Britain
to that course, the spirit of that agreement, the military arrangements made
by the French in reliance on that spirit, and the benefits knowingly received
by the British from those arrangements, all dictated that the only honorable
course of action was to join the French against Germany. Churchill as
First Lord of the Admiralty had participated in the Anglo-French Naval
Convention pf 1912 (although not of the understandings of a like nature
that had preceded that more formal Convention, and not as a prime mover
in 1912, which was Sir Edward Grey on the British side). The French had
concentrated their fleet in the Mediterranean in reliance on that Convention,
leaving their northern coasts exposed to German aggression; and the British
got the benefit of concentrating their fleet in the North Sea to maintain their
numerical advantage over the Germans in first class battleships available
in that theatre; the British also needed and accepted French protection of
their trade routes in the Mediterranean and Suez and had assured the French
a like protection of French interests in the Channel. How could an honorable
country who had accepted such benefits not do what was promised to obtain
them?
The honor of Britain motivated Churchill to his unswerving determination
to bring Britain into the War alongside of France. Churchill was one of
those who believed that states could have or lack something called honor,
and that to lack it in one’s own state was unthinkable. In his eyes the Belgians
had honor for refusing the German demand of free passage, even though
so doing committed them to a hopeless resistance against overwhelming
odds that cost many Belgian lives; by the same token, the Germans were
dishonored by invading Belgium and the British had what was “indisputably
an obligation of honor” to join “the heroic nation of King Albert” in resisting
the German advance towards France—“it was on that ground that I
personally, with others, took my stand.”69 Likewise, the French had honor
in refusing the German demand that France give up her frontier forts; as

68.
69.
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Churchill praised France for this: “She did not beg.”70 Finally and most
crucially, Churchill concluded that Britain’s honor demanded that she use
force to defend the French coast: “Whatever disclaimer we had made about
not being committed, could we, when it came to the point, honorably stand
by and see the naked French coasts ravaged and bombarded by German
Dreadnoughts. . .?”71
This motivation of honor means that Churchill too, like the Kaiser, did
not do what he did because he wanted a war for its own sake. Rightly or
wrongly,72 Churchill thought that British honor demanded the War.
Other candidates for war-loving causers of the War could also here be
examined in detail, the leading suspects here being Conrad, von Moltke,
and Sazonov, three of the most bellicose war hawks in Austria, Germany,
and Russia, respectively. But they too, although they may have intended
the War early on, did so because they thought it would reap them other
advantages that we shall shortly explore.
2. Actions by Those Intending the War as a Means to Other
Ends (As Opposed to Only Foreseeing the War As a
Side-Consequence of What They Did Intend)
Here the list of candidates is long, for at some point each of the actors
we are examining came to form the intention to take his nation into the
War. As we have just seen, none did so with the War as an end in itself;
but at some point all the principal actors did so intend, with the War as a
means. Two questions are salient about each of these actors: when were
these intentions formed, and for what ends? Consider first one of the actors
whose psychology we have already described, Kaiser Wilhelm.

70. Id. at 166.
71. Id. at 163. Such a view led Edward Grey to formally warn the German
government that its High Seas Fleet of battleships would not be allowed to enter the North
Sea or the English Channel in order to attack the coasts or the shipping of France. This
was on August 2, before Germany had declared war on France (August 3) and before
Britain itself had declared war on Germany (August 4). On that same day, August 2, British
and French naval staffs began coordinating their command structure, assigned responsibilities
in the Mediterranean and the North Sea, and coordinated joint use of naval bases.
72. Many of the young men who were lucky enough to survive the horrors of
combat in World War I would no doubt agree with the assessment of those who took
to mountaineering to distance themselves from their war-time memories: “Privilege and
honor died in the trenches.” WADE DAVIS, INTO THE SILENCE: THE GREAT WAR, MALLORY,
AND THE CONQUEST OF EVEREST (2011).
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Allied wartime propaganda construed the Kaiser as having intended war
all along, June 28–August 4. Wilhelm’s cousin, Nicholas II, came to the same
view late in the evening on August 1, namely, that Wilhelm had all along
intended war and was just pretending in their Nicky-Willy correspondence to
care about avoiding war by negotiating mutual demobilization of their
armies.73 Yet the construal was pretty plainly wrong. On July 5 when
Wilhelm gave Count Hoyos of Austria Germany’s “blank check,” it is not
at all clear that he intended that Austria cash it by declaring war on Serbia
(whether he foresaw that an Austro-Serbian war would result from his action
is another matter, one we shall attend to shortly); later, when Wilhelm
learned of the Serbian capitulation to the Austrian ultimatum on all points
save one, Wilhelm neither intended such a war nor probably even foresaw
it—in fact, he was genuinely pleased that now there wouldn’t have to be
even such a limited war. Likewise on July 29 when the Kaiser authorized
his Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, to urge the Austrians to stop at Belgrade
and invade Serbia no further, he was probably sincere in not intending
further war upon Serbia by Austria (whatever may have been the signalings
to the contrary by his Chancellor and his Army Chief of Staff to the Austrians).
August 1 appears to be the day on which Wilhelm formed his intent that
there be a war between Austria/Germany and Russia but even then not with
France if it could be avoided—thus his delight late in the day of August 1
at receiving the (what turned out to be) misinformation that Britain would
guarantee French neutrality. At most Wilhelm’s intent with respect to war
with France (at the time at which he authorized the German ultimatum to
France) was only a conditional intent: if the French did not assent to surrender
possession of their frontier forts, then there would be war between France
and Germany. The evening of August 1 is also when he knew that war with
Russia meant war with France, and that war with France meant war with
England.
This conclusion about Wilhelm’s intentions presupposes a number of
psychological assumptions that I shall now make explicit, assumptions that
we would need to have in hand in order to examine the psychology of other
actors as well. First, there is the basic assumption that I made in distinguishing
intentions from predictive beliefs, viz, that a belief that one’s action will
produce some result R is to be distinguished from an intention to produce
R motivating that action. Jeremy Bentham, for one, disputed this assumption
insofar as he classified such predictive beliefs about one’s own future actions
as a kind of intention, what Bentham called an “oblique (as opposed to a
73. See ROBERT MASSIE, NICHOLAS AND ALEXANDRA at 272–73 (1967). Nicholas
declaimed that night about the Kaiser: “He was never sincere, not a moment.” Nicholas
claimed that upon having resolved this ambiguity about Wilhelm, “all was over forever
between me and William,” and that this allowed him to sleep that night “extremely well.”
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“direct”) intention.”74 The common law of England has for centuries agreed
with Bentham, insofar as that law classified results “substantially certain”
to occur within the content of the actor’s predictive beliefs as “general (as
opposed to “specific”) intentions.”75
Yet Bentham and the common law that followed him on this were wrong.
Believing that something is the case is psychologically distinct from intending
to make it be the case. The first explains a result in terms of the actor’s
willingness to tolerate such a result flowing from his actions; the second
explains that result in term’s of the actor’s wanting the result to obtain,
either as the end his action serves or at least as the means to attaining that
end. And the moral difference in blameworthiness tracks this explanatory
difference, as we have seen.76
Even so, Wilhelm and the other principal actors of 1914 illustrate problems
in psychology that threaten to undermine this crucial distinction between
intention and predictive belief. One of these stems from the general problem
of content individuation for Intentional states like intentions and beliefs.
To use an old example of mine:77 suppose Herod wants more than anything
to please Salome; this requires John the Baptist’s head on a platter to be served
to Salome; John therefore orders John’s head to be severed from his body
and served to Salome on a platter; and Salome is pleased, getting Herod
what he wanted. Can Herod seriously say that he didn’t intend John’s death?
Can he say that although he intended John to be decapitated and although
he foresaw (predictively believed) that John wouldn’t survive without his
head, he still didn’t need John to actually die (he only needed that Salome
believe that John had died), and that he would have been enormously pleased
if John somehow could have survived headless? So that if God, like the
common law of attempts, punishes Herod only if he (specifically) intended
the death of John, God must acquit Herod?
When most people are confronted with these kinds of examples, they
reject the idea that Herod only predicted but did not intend the death of John.
74. J EREMY B ENTHAM , AN INTRODUCTION TO THE P RINCIPLES OF M ORALS AND
LEGISLATION (1789).
75. See Michael Moore, Intention as a Marker of Moral Culpability and Legal Punishability,
in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW (R.A. Duff & S. Green eds., 2011).
76. Even the common law of crimes recognized this moral difference: for inchoate
and accomplice liabilities at common law—crimes where the causal contribution to some
bad result is non-existent or at least lesser and where culpability of mental state is thus of
greater importance to overall blameworthiness—the common law required true intentions,
intentions it called “specific intent,” an intent that excludes predictive belief. See id.
77. Moore, Intentions and Mens Rea, supra note 23.
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They say that the death of John is “too close” to the decapitation of John
for someone to intend the one without intending the other. More formally, if
an actor intends some result R, and if S is close to R, then the actor also
intends S.78 Such an indeterminacy in content attribution for intentions
makes less clear historical conclusions about who intended the War and
when. Conrad, for example, famously strode out of Berchtold’s office on
July 6 shouting, “War, war, war!” Clearly Conrad intended war between
Serbia and Austria; was war with Russia “close” to war with Serbia (because
of the existing tie of perceived Russian interests to those of Serbia) so that
one can say the Conrad intended a larger war on July 6? In this case, no
matter what indeterminacy there may be to the idea of closeness, surely the
answer is no. And that same negative answer is true for each of the actors
who at some point formed the intent to wage a limited war only, including
Wilhelm on the evening of August 1 (when he intended war with Russia
but not with France or England). This same conclusion obtains even for
actors who knew for certain that their actions would lead to war—as in
Pasic’s decision to refuse one of the terms of the Austrian ultimatum on
July 25, knowing full well that doing so would result in an Austrian declaration
of war. Pasic’s was still only a predictive belief, not an intention, that the
Austrians declare war on Serbia because the intended refusal of the
ultimatum is not so close to the declaration of war by Austria that to have
intended the first was also to have intended the second.
The state of mind of Sazonov on July 24 might seem to present a closer
question. As we have seen, Sazonov, on hearing the terms of the Austrian
ultimatum on July 24, famously exclaimed (in French) that this meant a
general European war. When Sazonov ordered the secret, preliminary
mobilization of the Russian army on that date, my reading of the evidence
tells me that motivating that action was an intent that there be war between
Russia and Austria. Did he also, on that date, intend war with Germany,
with at least France if not England at Russia’s side? (Did he, that is, intend
a general European war?)79 Consider this fact, well known to Sazonov
from his experience in 1912: both the geography of the Russian/Austrian
border and the locations of Russian railroad lines were such that a “partial”
mobilization of the Russian army against Austria but so as not to threaten
Germany was impossible. Both factors (the border, and the railroads) dictated
78. MOORE, MECHANICAL CHOICES, supra note 8, at 118–27. As I there explore, it
is a tricky business to spell out what the relation of “closeness” is in this context, but a lot
of our common sense psychology depends on there being some such relation.
79. One reading of the historical record has it that Sazonov intended the War early
on because such a general European war was Russia’s only means of being allowed (by
France, Germany, and England) to acquire the Straits from Turkey. I am assuming here
that this was not true of Sazonov, much as it seemed to be true of the even more hawkish
members of the Council of Ministers such as Krivoshein.
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that to mobilize against Austria required Russian mobilization against Austria
to take place in Russian Poland, which was also where any Russian army
mobilization against Germany would also take place. So when Sazonov
intended mobilization of the army in Russian Poland, did he necessarily
intend an anti-German mobilization (i.e., a mobilization that would be
effective against the Germans) as much as an anti-Austrian mobilization?
Was an anti-German Russian mobilization too close to an anti-Austrian
Russian mobilization—because the exact same deployment of troops in
Polish rail centers constituted each—for Sazonov to have intended the latter
without also having intended the former? That answer might well be in the
affirmative; but still, that would only mean that Sazonov intended war
if declarations of war are “close” to general mobilizations, and this seems
improbable.80
Yet the Sazonov example of ordering mobilization on July 24 reveals
another conundrum that must be solved in maintaining a distinction between
what is intended versus what is only foreseen. This is the problem of
whether an intention vis-à-vis some circumstance existing when the act in
question is done (as opposed to the intentions vis-à-vis some future occurring
consequence that we have been discussing hitherto) is anything more than
a belief that that circumstance exists. That Russia’s rail lines were located
where they were in 1914, and that the hub of those lines in Warsaw was
equidistant to both the Russia/German borders as it was to the Russia/
Austria borders (and thus equally suitable to a Russian invasion of Germany
as a Russian invasion of Austria), were facts that the parties actions’ in July
1914 could not alter. They were thus circumstances in which Sazonov
ordered Russian mobilization in Poland, not consequences of that action.
Did Sazonov’s intention to mobilize Russian troops in the Warsaw District
embrace as part of its content that such mobilization would be as available
for an invasion of Germany as much as an invasion of Austria? Or did he
only know this but not intend it?
This is an old conundrum in the philosophy of mind, ethics, and the
criminal law. Jones intends to kill Smith who is a cop; if Jones knows that
Smith is a cop, does he necessarily intend to kill a cop simply because of
that knowledge? Or does Jones not only have to believe that Smith is a

80. Despite the belief held by many Germans that general mobilization meant war,
these are too distinct a pair of states of affairs to infer an intent to declare the latter from
an intent to do the former. The Tsar seemed to understand this pretty well in his last
telegram to “Willy” on August 1: “these measures [mobilization] do not mean war.”
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cop but have to be motivated by that circumstance—say by Jones being
in a cop-killing contest where one “scores” only if one’s victim is a cop?81
There are three positions on this issue: (1) Intending to cause R believing
that one is acting in circumstance C is to intend C as well as R; (2) Intending
to cause R when that intention is formed by its holder only because he
knows that C is present; and (3) an intermediate position whereby if C enters
into the description of R that the actor does intend, will there be an intention
with respect to C.82 On the first of these construals, Sazonov intended a
German-vulnerable Russian mobilization because he knew that mobilizing
the army in Poland was such a mobilization; on the second of these construals
Sazonov intended a German-vulnerable Russian mobilization only if he
formed the intention to mobilize Russian troops in Poland because such
mobilization would have this characteristic; and on the third of these construals,
whether Sazonov intended a German-vulnerable Russian mobilization depends
on whether his description of the mobilization he ordered included
“German-vulnerable.”
Few if any of the individuals we are considering, at the times we are
considering, unconditionally intended a general European war. Rather,
their intentions were conditional: if Serbia does not agree to all the terms
of the Austrian ultimatum, then Austria will declare war on Serbia (Conrad,
Berchtold, July 23); if Austria declares war on Serbia, Russia will declare
war on Austria (Sazonov, July 24); if Russia does not cease general mobilization
of its army, then Germany will declare war on Russia (Bethmann-Hollweg,
July 30); if Germany invades France at all, and particularly if it does so
through Belgium, Britain will declare war on Germany (Grey, Churchill,
July 28); etc. Indeed, it is this interlocking set of conditional intentions
that gives rise to the domino-like actions/reactions that produce the War.
Conditional intentions are still intentions, despite their partial dependence
on there being beliefs about the conditions that make the intentions
conditional. To explain: first distinguish a conditional intention from an
intention on condition. The latter is where the actor knows that if some
condition C is realized in the future, that he will then form an intention to
do some action A. The condition, in other words, is not within the content
of a present intention but is rather an external condition to there being an
intention at all; the form is: if condition C occurs, then actor X intends (X
do action A). By contrast, true conditional intentions are present intentions

81. Not an imaginary situation. See Fountain v. United States, 768 F.2d 790 (7th
Cir. 1985).
82. The last position is articulated by GIDEON YAFFE, ATTEMPTS IN THE CRIMINAL
LAW AND IN THE P HILOSOPHY OF ACTION (2010). All three positions are discussed in
MOORE, MECHANICAL CHOICES, supra note 8, at 128–41.
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that have a condition within their content; in such cases the actor, X, right
now intends (A if C is realized in the future).
Conditional intentions are real intentions in that the actor possessing one
has made a decision; she has resolved whatever conflicts may exist between
her desires and between her beliefs, and she has formed an intention that
is “sticky” with respect to the future in the sense that rationality dictates
she act on her intention unless she changes her mind. That there is a condition
precedent to so acting does not change the intention into anything else; it
is still a projection into an uncertain future of one’s plans for action. It is,
in Aquinas’ words, still a setting of one’s will towards evil, in cases where
what is conditionally intended is bad.
Conditional intentions challenge the intent/belief distinction in the following
ways: first, there can be uncertainty about whether an actor has a conditional
intention (to do A if C) or only has a predictive belief (if C, then intend
(do A)). Still, this is only an epistemic worry. Second, the more the actor
believes the condition on which his intention depends is realized, the closer
is his intention to an unconditional intention. Sazonov, for example, on
July 24 intended Russia to declare war on Austria if Austria declared war
on Serbia, and Sazonov believed that the Austrian declaration of war on
Serbia was a virtual certainty after he read the terms of the Austrian ultimatum;
whereas if Sazonov thought the Austrian declaration of war to be very
unlikely or even impossible, then his conditional intention is far removed
from a decision for Russia to declare war on Austria. So conditional intentions
are in this sense belief-dependent: their commitment of the will (like an
unconditional intention) is in proportion to the certainty of the belief about
the relevant condition. Still, despite this belief-dependence, conditional
intentions are still decisions, and they are still explanatory of the actions
that they motivate.
The issue of moral culpability for conditional intentions is an interesting
one. Here historians interested in the war-guilt question could take a page
from the common law of crimes, which has explored this issue extensively.
Some Anglo-American authorities of criminal law pretend that the moral
issue is easy: conditional intentions render the actor who acts on them as
fully culpable as the actor who acts on unconditional intentions.83 Yet the

83. M ODEL P ENAL CODE § 2.02(7) (AM . L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962).
The only exception the Code provides to this equation is when the condition inside the
content of the actor’s intention negates the wrongfulness of his action, as in an attempted
“rapist” who intends intercourse with a female if she consents.

593

MOORE2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

10/10/2022 2:30 PM

actual case decisions are much more nuanced than this, and much more
divided about equating a conditional intention to an unconditional one.84
A line of cases of particular relevance to the present context are conditional
intent cases where the condition attached is non-compliance by the victim
of some demand made by the alleged perpetrator of some crime. For example,
the actor points a gun at the victim and threatens to shoot the victim unless
the victim releases his grip on the defendant’s mules; if the victim does
release his grip, was the defendant guilty of the crime of assault because
he did the act of threatening someone with the intent to shoot that person?
The common law cases hold that this depends on whether the actor who
conditionally intended to shoot was entitled to make the demand he did,
the demand non-compliance with which by the victim was a condition of
his intention.85
Applying this criterion (of when a conditional intention is culpable) to
the earlier mentioned 1914 examples, makes the question of culpability
for Berchtold, Pasic, Sazonov, Bethmann-Hollweg, and Grey turn on the
legitimacy of their demands, non-compliance with which was a condition
to their intentions to go to war. These are complicated historical questions
the resolution of which is far from clear. Surely Austria was entitled to be
outraged by the assassination of the heir to the Hapsburg throne on their
own territory by paid agents of the Serbian state; did that righteous outrage
extend to investigating the “threads that reach to Belgrade” by Austrian
officials in Serbian territory (the sticking point in the Austrian ultimatum)?
And perhaps Germany had some claim of necessity (and/or pre-emption
of a like action by France) in demanding free passage of its troops across
Belgium, as the Kaiser argued to an initially sympathetic Teddy Roosevelt
early in the War. But I shall leave resolution of these and like questions
about the other demands to the war-guilt historians.
The last issue about the 1914 actors’ intentions needing resolution here
is raised by the conflicting, contradictory, and vacillating nature of Kaiser
Wilhelm’s intentions. As stated earlier, Wilhelm was a weak man, indecisive,
and susceptible to manipulation of his beliefs and intentions by the stronger
willed officials who nominally served him. A fair construal of the Kaiser’s
state of mind between June 28 and August 4, 1914, is that he did and did
84. In the leading American case on conditional intentions, Holloway v. United
States, 526 U.S. 1 (1999), Justice Scalia in dissent correctly points out that the Model Penal
Code is far too simplistic on this point. See generally MOORE, MECHANICAL CHOICES,
supra note 8, at 110; Gideon Yaffe, Conditional Intent and Mens Rea, 10 LEGAL THEORY
277–310 (2004).
85. The Holloway opinion relies on this line of cases to hold that the car-jacker who
intends to shoot the owner of the car if she does not relinquish possession does have a culpable
intention (even though conditional) because he was not entitled to make the demand that
he did.
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not intend that there be a war: between Austria and Serbia; between Austria/
Germany and Russia/Serbia; between Austria/Germany and Russia/Serbia/
France; and between those last parties and England too.86
The psychological question of what the Kaiser intended during this period
must revisit another well known conundrum about intentions: when does
the lack of resolution in an intention make that mental state not an intention
at all? The issue arises because the word, “intention,” is at least in part a
functional term, a term that refers to something whose essential nature is
given by the function(s) it can serve. A knife, for example, is a thing that
cuts, making “knife” a functional term. On a functionalist approach to the
nature of mental states, intentions are those states that: are causal intermediaries
between background motivations (i.e., belief/desire sets) and actions; resolve
conflicts between prima facie beliefs and conflicts between component desires
to arrive at decisions about what to do; are parts of plans (hierarchies of
intentions) that dictate how the ends that move actors will be achieved;
are “sticky’ in the sense that they preclude constant revisiting of the questions
of why or how ends and means will be done; etc. A mental state that fulfills
none of these functions cannot be an intention, given such a functional
specification of what intentions are.
The Kaiser had his bellicose moments. In such moods he no doubt went
along with Moltke’s calculation that since war with Russia was inevitable,
better it be in 1914 than later when the French-financed railroad system
was completed (allowing more rapid deployment of Russian troops), when
the significant revamping of the Russian Army was also finished, and when
the rapidly growing Russian economy was even stronger and its already
huge population was even larger. Wilhelm no doubt also had his war-like
intentions against the French, given the desirability of removing that constant
threat to Germany’s western borders. And even vis-à-vis the English who
Wilhelm admired so much, his was a love/hate relation. Yet more often
the Kaiser feared war between Germany and any of these parties, and
intended that there would not be such war(s). On this state of facts, how
should we characterize the Kaiser’s intent with regard to the War?
The Kaiser’s mental instability is so pronounced as to call into question
whether he had any intentions with respect to the War, at any times prior
to his actually signing the declarations of war against Russia, France, and
England. There is a vagueness here that is hard to eliminate; it is like the
86. The same conflicts, contradictions, and vacillations also exist for the Kaiser’s
predictive beliefs about these matters; but in the text I shall only deal with his intentions.
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question of when something that structurally resembles a knife becomes
so dull that it is no longer just a dull knife but is no knife at all . The
Kaiser’s instability rarely took the form of actual conflict in his intentions
—simultaneously holding two contradictory intentions is psychologically
possible but is so extremely irrational as to be rare in sane individuals.87
More common are where intentions conflict, not simultaneously, but over
an interval of time. This is the problem of vacillating intentions.
A well known instance of this problem—a case that begins many abnormal
psychology textbooks—is the case of Phineas Gage.88 Gage was a railroad
foreman working in New Hampshire in 1848. He was tamping down a railroad
spike with a 5 foot iron tamping bar when an explosion sent the bar clean
through his skull, taking much of his left frontal lobe with it. Remarkably
this didn’t kill him or even render him unconscious; but it did change him.
Prior to the accident “he possessed a well-balanced mind, and was looked
upon by those who knew him as a shrewd, smart businessman, very energetic
and persistent in executing all his plans of operation.”89 After the damage
to his frontal lobes Gage became “fitful, irreverent, indulging at times in
the grossest profanity (which was not previously his custom), manifesting
but little deference for his fellows, impatient of restraint or advice when it
conflicts with his desires, at times pertinaciously obstinate, yet capricious
and vacillating, devising many plans of future operations, which are no
sooner arranged than they are abandoned in turn for others appearing more
feasible.”90
Like Gage, the Kaiser probably suffered brain damage, although in his
case this was due to a nine hour breech-birth delivery that deprived his
brain of oxygen and almost killed his mother, Queen Victoria’s daughter
Victoria. This brain damage in turn may well have been responsible for
Wilhelm’s peripatetic vacillation in intention. Even his sympathetic biographers
describe Wilhelm (and the “hairpin bends” in the foreign policy that he
promoted) as due to “the contradictory nature of his character which
bounced back and forth from left to right, black to white, like a shuttlecock
87. Contradictory intentions can be of several kinds: (1) External contradiction: the
Kaiser at t intended war and at t it was not the case that he intended war; (2) Internal
contradiction: the Kaiser at t both intended war and intended that there be no war; (3)
Conflict of intentions without contradiction in their contents: the Kaiser at t intended war
and he intended to maintain good relations with his English cousins, not seeing that these
intentions conflicted in that both could not be realized. Like contradictory intentions in its
irrationality is (4) Belief/intention inconsistency: the Kaiser at t intended that he prevent
the War and yet believed that this was impossible.
88. John Fleischman, PHINEAS GAGE: A GRUESOME BUT TRUE STORY ABOUT BRAIN
SCIENCE (2002).
89. The description of his attending physician, John Martyn Harlow. See MOORE,
MECHANICAL CHOICES, supra note 8, at 365 n.11.
90. Id.
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over a badminton net.”91 Another of his biographers described Wilhelm
as:
a man of intelligence but of poor judgment, of tactless outbursts and short-lived
enthusiasms, a fearful, panic-prone figure who often acted on impulse out of
a sense of weakness and threat . . . a more fundamental problem was the Kaiser’s
utter inability to devise or follow through a coherent political programme of his
own. . . . [Wilhelm was a man] whose goals changed drastically from one moment
to the next. He picked up ideas, enthused over them, grew bored or discouraged,
and dropped them again. He was angry with the tsar one week but infatuated with
him the next. He reacted with fury to perceived slights and provocations, but
panicked at the prospect of genuine confrontation or conflict.92

Such vacillation of intention makes it precarious to ascribe intentions—
or at least any very serious intentions—to Wilhelm, any more than to Gage.
Some of the functions of intentions were there, such as serving as a causal
intermediary; but the two crucial functions of stability of plan and resolution
of conflict were sadly deficient.
Explaining the War by the intentions to have such a war by Wilhelm,
Nicholas, George V, Franz Josef, Poincare, Pasic, and their ministers, is thus
a tricky business. These just surveyed problems in intention ascription—
problems of content individuation (for both results of actions and the
circumstances in which actions are done), conditional intentions, and
contradictory and/or vacillating intentions—make the history complicated
enough as to be philosophically interesting. My own conclusions? There
are very few plausible candidates (amongst the actors playing significant
causal/counterfactual/probabilistic roles in bringing about the War) for the
opprobrium appropriate to those intending a general European war by their
actions. Despite his bellicose moments, not the Kaiser until August 1, nor
his Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg; perhaps Moltke and Falkenhayn with
their twin ideas of inevitability of a general war and propitiousness of
the occasion for war in 1914. Certainly not Nicholas until August 1; but
perhaps his foreign minister, Sazonov, as early as July 24, and his agriculture
minister, Krivoshein, quite a bit before that. Not George V until August
4, nor Asquith, Grey, or Churchill until that date too. Poincare is more of
a question mark, for as a native of Lorraine, one of the two provinces of
France ceded to Germany at the end of the Franco-Prussian War, he may
well have egged on the Russians July 20–23 precisely to get the general
war needed to return Lorrain (and Alsace) to France. Likewise, not Franz
91.
92.

MACDONOGH, THE LAST KAISER: THE LIFE OF WILHELM II 7 (2003).
CLARK, KAISER WILHELM II, supra note 52, at 361–62.

597

MOORE2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

10/10/2022 2:30 PM

Josef or Berchtold, for despite their oft-quoted expressions that given its
long decline the Empire might as well go out with a bang as with a whimper,
never intended a general war, as much as they early on intended war with
Serbia. The extremely bellicose Conrad is more ambiguous: it is often
said that he wanted war to impress the love of his life who unfortunately
was married to another; the war was supposed to give him heroic stature
such that she would leave her spouse for him. Yet surely a limited war with
Serbia would fulfill his romantic ambitions, if indeed that is what moved
him; a general European war, the result of which must be much more in
doubt than a war against tiny Serbia, surely wasn’t needed.
Two things are constant with respect to the mental states of all of these
actors, however. One I remarked on before: none were war-lovers who valued
a general European war for its own sake. The other is the recklessness
displayed by them all. All of them shared Churchill’s view that Europe in
1914 was the proverbial powder keg waiting for the spark that would blow
it up. Each of them, with each of the actions or omissions that we have detailed,
knew there was a risk that they were helping to bring on a general war.
And they each consciously took those risks for reasons that, while seemingly
sufficient to them at the time, were woefully unjustified risks to have taken.
Their reckless beliefs, and the actions they took in light of those beliefs,
is the common denominator in explaining the War through the bottleneck
of June 28–July 4, 1914.
B. Assessing the Causal/Counterfactual/Probabilistic Significance of
the Actions of June 28–August 4, 1914
I come now to applying the second dimension of my taxonomy to
explanations of the War in terms of the “bottleneck” of actions between
June 28–August 4, 1914. (This dimension was drawn in terms of the kind
of relations that held between what was intended and done by various
actors, on the one hand, and the outbreak of the War, on the other.) Whose
actions were the major causes of the War? Who had the best chance to
have prevented the War but didn’t? Whose actions or omissions made the
War significantly more likely? Did anyone’s actions or omissions make
the War inevitable at some point?
Let us isolate the candidates for actions or omissions that significantly
explain the outbreak of the War:
1.
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2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

7.
8.
9.

10.
11.
12.

13.
14.

Throughout almost all of June Serbian Prime Minister Pasic does
not reveal to the Austrians all he knew of this plot prior to the
assassination.
Princeps’ killing of the Archduke on June 28.
The collective decision of Franz Josef, Conrad, and Berchtold
between June 28 and July 4 to make war on Serbia if German
support could be obtained to forestall possible Russian intervention.
The Kaiser’s blank check on July 5 and Bethmann-Hollweg’s
reiterated blank check on July 6 assuring the Austrians of full
German support against Russia.
With the German blank check in hand, the initial decision on July
7, and the final decision on July 19, of Berchtold, Conrad, and
Tisza for Austria to declare war on Serbia via an ultimatum to
Serbia that the Serbs could not accept, and the delivery of that
ultimatum to Serbia on July 23.
Poincare’s assurance of French support of Russia in any war with
Germany, given July 20–23.
With French support against Germany assured, Sazonov’s assurance
of Russian support to the Serbians on July 24.
Done only upon Sazanov’s urging, the Tsar’s secret “partial”
mobilization of the Russian army starting July 24 and continuing
unabated until a public, general mobilization order is issued July
30.
With Russian support of Serbia against Austria assured, the rejection
of the Austrian ultimatum by Pasic on July 25; Pasic’s order
mobilizing the Serbia army on that same date.
The seeming assurance of the Kaiser by King George on July 26
that Britain would stay out of a general continental war.
The omission of the Kaiser and of Bethmann-Hollweg (both of
whom had been absent from Berlin) to inform themselves of the
terms of the Austrian ultimatum, or the terms of the Serbian
rejection, until July 27; their resulting omission to restrain the
Austrians from taking military action on that date.
The Austrian declaration of war against Serbia on July 28, followed
immediately by the bombardment of Belgrade on July 29.
Berchtold’s and Conrad’s ignoring of the Kaiser’s wish (expressed
by Bethmann-Hollweg on July 29) that Austria not further invade
Serbia beyond Belgrade.
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15. The omission until July 29 by both Grey and George V to make
clear to the Germans that Britain would not remain neutral in a
war between France and Germany.
16. The Tsar allowing himself to be persuaded by Sazonov to go
against his own misgivings and against the warnings of Wilhelm
and Bethmann-Hollweg, to order general, public mobilization of
the Russian army on July 30.
17. On August 1: (a) the Kaiser’s order to mobilize the German
army; (b) Viviani’s order to mobilize the French army; (c) the
Kaiser’s declaration of war by Germany against Russia; (d) the
order/remanded order/reinstated order for the German army to
invade Luxembourg, preparatory to invading France.
18. On August 2: the sending of the German ultimatum to Belgium.
19. On August 3: (a) King Albert’s decision to refuse the terms of the
German ultimatum. (b) The Kaiser’s declaration of war of Germany
against France.
20. On August 4: (a) Moltke’s order beginning the invasion of Belgium.
(b) Grey’s ultimatum to Germany to cease operations in Belgium
else war is declared by Britain on Germany as of midnight Berlin
time. (c) The Kaiser/Bethmann-Hollweg’s/Moltke’s omission to
cease operations in Belgium before the expiration of the time set
by the British ultimatum.
Even restricted to the actions, omissions, and decisions taking place during
what I have been calling the bottleneck period of June 28–August 4, this
is a dauntingly complex set of interlocking factors explaining why the
War began. Let us start by asking after causes. Almost all of these items
1–20 are actions that helped to cause the War to start. The exceptions are
items 2 (Pasic’s omission to come fully clean about the assassination plot),
12 (the Kaiser’s and Bethmann-Hollweg’s omissions to learn enough to
know that Austria needed restraining and to restrain Austria), and 15 (Grey’s
and George’s omission to clarify the likelihood of British neutrality). I do
not include items 14 and 20(c) as exceptions because these are not true
omissions. As to item 14: ignoring something is often an omission; but
not if the actor does his ignoring by positive action, say, by continuing the
invasion of Serbia on July 29. The act of invasion is then an act of ignoring
(the wish of the Kaiser) but it is still an act causing something, not an
omission to prevent that thing. The fact that the Kaiser’s wish is ignored
is then but a circumstance that existed at the time the acts of invasion were
being done; this makes it no more an omission than rape is an omission
(because rape is the omission to obtain the woman’s consent). As to item
20(c): an omission to cease some action one is continuing to do is an
omission, yet it presupposes that the person so omitting is still doing
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something. To omit to cease an invasion of Belgium presupposes one is
still doing the actions that constitute invading Belgium.93
As remarked on before, causation is a scalar affair, that is, a more-orless relation admitting of degrees causal contribution varying along a smooth
continuum. That being so, it makes sense to ask which of factors 1, 3–11,
13–14, 16–20, were the biggest causal contributors to the outbreak of the
War? Was Baron Muslin, for example, correct in his braggadocio that he
was the hoss that caused the loss (because he drafted the Austrian ultimatum)?
Scalarity of causation is not an easy notion to unpack. One thing that is
clear is that a crucial mistake to be avoided is the infusion of moral notions
into assessments of how much something was a cause of something else.
Lawyers, philosophers of ordinary language, and others often enough think
that greater blameworthiness of some action for some result makes that
action a bigger cause of that result. This can lead to silly maxims like that
of Anglo-American common law: “No result can be remote if intended.”
In such maxims something that does matter to culpability—the intention
with which an act is done—is made to matter to causation. This is simply
double counting, blaming someone once for intending something and blaming
them again for causing it because one intended it.
It is easier to say what scalarity of causation is not than to say what it
is. But that is because what scalarity of causation is, depends entirely on
what causation itself is; and that of course is a much debated question. On
my own views about causation, we can put aside scalarity of causation
based on either counterfactual dependence or probabilistic dependence;
for although there are theories of causation that identify it with one or the
other of these relations, I have elsewhere (and at least to my own satisfaction)
93. Conversely, one might question whether item 2 is truly an omission, on the
ground that not telling all one knows (about some assassination plot, say) presupposes that
one has said something, which is an action. Thus, some theorists of omissions have
questioned whether examples of this kind can even be classified as acts or omissions. Thus
Amit Pundik, Can One Deny both Causation by Omission and Causal Pluralism? The Case of
Legal Causation, in CAUSATION AND PROBABILITY IN THE SCIENCES (Russo and Williamson
eds., 2007) defies us to classify examples such as, “The nurse gave only one-half the
infusion required to save the patient”—act of giving one-half, or omission to give the other
half? Yet this is not the problem Pundik thinks it is. If the speaker knows that the patient
died from an allergic reaction to the one-half given, then the statement is probably being
used to refer to the act of giving one-half; if the speaker knows that the patient died because
he needed the full dose, then he probably is referring to the omission to give the second
half needed. Similarly, Pasic’s half-hearted warning to the Austrians didn’t mislead them
with any false information given; he simply didn’t say enough to alert the Austrians to the
real danger, an omission.
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argued against these identities.94 Indeed, that is what allows me to organize
my discussion around these three distinct relations. More to the present
point are physicalist and primitivist theories as to the nature of the causal
relation. On a physicalist view, scalarity is presumably measured by the
physical magnitudes posited by the particular theory to constitute the essence
of the causal relation—degree of energy transference, clarity of mark
preservation, etc. On a primitivist view, one doesn’t quite know what to
say, or even if there is anything much to be said. Generally speaking, if the
nature of causation is a primitive then so can be the fact that it is scalar in
its magnitudes.
Assuming that the singular causal relation is a scalar affair, which were
the big causes of the four declarations of war that we seek to explain? The
difficulty of answering this question is symptomatic of the divorce of the
notion of explanatory importance from the degree of causal influence in
the present context of enquiry. In other contexts there is no such divorce:
if we are explaining why some victim died from loss of blood, the larger
causal contribution of a large cutting (as opposed to the lesser causal contribution
of a minor cutting) correlates with greater explanatory salience of the large
cutting. The same is true for other causal scenarios involving simultaneously
operating events with physical magnitudes, such as where two fires of
different size join to burn down a house, two noises of different volume
of sound coincide to scare a horse, two floods of different volumes of water
join to flood a basement, two cars of different mass and speeds collide to
the destruction of both cars.95 But where as here there are no obvious
asymmetries of physical magnitudes involved, and where some factors operate
more remotely in time than others (and thus are non-simultaneous), we
lose our grip on size of causal contribution just as we are unsure of degree
of explanatory salience. I suggest that in these latter kinds of cases (including
the one before us), four relations different than degree of causal contribution
governs the explanatory importance of different factors. One is the degree
of necessity (i.e., strength of counterfactual dependence) of the factor in
question to the event to be explained: the greater the necessity the more
important explanatorily. A second is the degree of chance-raising done by
the factor in question: the more that factor raises the probability of the event
to be explained, the more important is that factor in explaining that event.
The third and fourth are what some would say form the limiting case of
the second, chance-raising, namely, where the factor in question makes
the event to be explained not just probable but certain to occur. Yet there
are two different notions at work to generate such “certainty,” and each is

94.
95.
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both distinct and is itself a matter of degree. The third relation is that of
sufficiency: how sufficient (in the sense explained earlier) for the occurrence
of the event to be explained was the factor in question, the more sufficient
being the explanatorily more powerful. The fourth relation is that of
inevitability: how inevitable (in the sense explained earlier) did the factor
in question make the event to be explained? I explore each of these four
dimensions of explanatory importance seriatim, discussing the nature of
these dimensions while applying each to the explanations of World War I.
The meaning to be given to there being degrees of necessity we have
analyzed before: one event e is more and more strongly necessary for another
event f if and only if f counterfactually depends on e in possible worlds that
are more and more remote (less close) from the actual world. The example
we previously used was the action of Princep in assassinating the Archduke:
the declarations starting World War I only weakly depended on that act if
those declarations would have occurred anyway even without the
assassination in relatively close possible worlds (put another way, only in
possible worlds very close to the actual world was the start of the War
dependent on the assassination). My reading of the history (although it is
a matter of some dispute) is that Churchill was right in his wartime reminiscences:
Europe was a powder keg waiting to blow up and had there been no
assassination it would have been something else that set it off.
Of the other nineteen acts or omissions in our earlier list, saliently
explaining the War because strongly necessary are the following counterfactuals:
(1) if Germany’s Kaiser and Chancellor had not issued the Austrians the
famous “blank check” on July 5–6, then in possible worlds quite distant
from the actual world the Austrians would not have drafted and delivered
the war-provoking ultimatum to Serbia (put into English: in the absence
of the German assurance there would have been no such ultimatum no
matter what else transpired because in virtually no circumstances would
Austria have dared to go it alone). (2) If Berchtold and his associates had
not drafted such a war-provoking ultimatum to Serbia, the Serbians would
have accepted the ultimatum and the Russians would not have secretly
mobilized their army. (3) Even if Berchtold and his associates had drafted
the war-provoking ultimatum to Serbia that they did, still the Serbians would
have acceded to that ultimatum had they not received the assurances of
Russian support that they did receive from Sazonov. (4) If Poincare had
not assured Nicholas and Sazonov of French support of Russia June 20–
23, then Sazonov would not have so steadfastly both reassured the Serbians
and mobilized the Russian Army from July 24 onward, resisting even the
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Tsar’s misgivings about doing so. (5) If the Russians had not gotten the
jump on mobilization by mobilizing their army first, the Germans would
not have mobilized theirs nor declared war on Russia. (6) If the Germans
had not declared war on Russia, it would not have declared war on France
nor would France have declared war on Germany. (7) If the Germans had
not declared war on France, they would not have invaded Belgium. (8)
Had the Germans neither invaded Belgium nor declared war on France,
Britain would not have sent its August 4 war-declaring ultimatum to
Germany (because Britain would not have intervened in a purely German/
Austrian/Serbian/Russian war).
These are all strongly necessary connections in the sense that events
would have had to have been very different from what in fact they were for
these counterfactual statements not to remain true. It is this fact, together
with the strongly linked nature of these counterfactuals, that gives such a
sense of the tragedy of World War I. Any one of these actors could have
prevented the War by not taking the actions that individually were so strongly
necessary for the War’s occurrence. The fact that none of them did so is
strongly explanatory of why the War occurred. (Turning from explanation to
evaluation, it is also a moral indictment of each of them for the reckless
culpability with which they did these acts that were so strongly necessary
for this catastrophe to have occurred; there is blame enough for all concerned.)
From the list of strongly necessary acts or omissions above, one may
have noted the absence of any mention of either the British assurances to
France that were an implicit part of the Entente, or the omission of Sir
Edward Grey or King George to make clear to the Germans just how firm
those assurances to France in fact were. That is because, as far as one can
tell, neither the making of British assurances to France nor the omission
to communicate with the Germans as to what these were, were strongly
necessary to the War occurring. True enough, Poincare relied on his hope
that Britain was at France’s back when Poincare assured the Russians of
French support; and equally surely, the Kaiser and Bethmann-Hollweg
relied on the British staying out of the impending conflict at crucial times
in their decision-making. And such reliances thus do enter in to explain
why the War occurred. Yet the most one can say of such reliances is that
they increased the likelihood of the War, not that they either made the war
inevitable nor even that they were necessary (in any but a weak sense) for
the War to have happened. For Poincare seemed willing to offer his assurances
to the Russians even though he knew that he did not have a commitment
from Britain; and Bethmann-Hollweg made his moves with the same lack
of certainty as to British intentions (and Moltke made plain his disdain for
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the threat posed by the intervention of the pitifully small British Army, 96
while the Kaiser joked about the irrelevance of the British fleet (“Dreadnoughts
don’t have wheels”), indicating for both of them the non-decisive nature
of British involvement).
The British assurances to the French and their lack of transparency
about them thus explain the War only in the secondary sense that these
factors increased the likelihood of the War. These factors do get a mention
in explaining the War, but only in this secondary way.
The third relation, that of sufficiency, seemingly is all important in
explicating the notion of explanatory importance. Yet as with the degree
of causation, this is something of an exaggeration. To see this, we first
must construct what might be meant by a notion of strong sufficiency. We
should start by recalling the context-sensitivity of “sufficiency” alluded to
earlier. For some factor x to be said to be sufficient for y is to say that no
other factor like x in the relevant respect(s) was necessary for y, context
supplying the respect(s) that is/are relevant in the typing of x. One ingredient
in making x more or less strongly sufficient for y is the breadth of the
respect(s) in which no other factor is necessary. The limiting case would
be that no other factor of any kind is necessary for y—but nothing is this
strongly sufficient for any y (because, e.g., things like the absence of a
Martian invasion is often no doubt necessary for many variables called
y). Another ingredient in making x strongly sufficient for y builds on the
notion of strength of necessity earlier adumbrated: x is more strongly
sufficient for y the weaker is the necessity in which it is said that no other
factor was necessary for y. In more ordinary English: if nothing else beyond
the Russian mobilization was even weakly necessary for the War to have
occurred, then the Russian mobilization was strongly sufficient for the War.
Truly strong sufficiency is rare for single events; most strongly sufficient
factors are sets of events and conditions, as John Stuart Mill famously
argued.97 None of the eight strongly necessary acts and omissions just
discussed, for example, were strongly sufficient for the War—too many
other things had to happen (for the War to have occurred) after Russian
96. Moltke like the rest of his German contemporaries no doubt grew up under the
tutelage of Bismarck’s scorn of the British Army; when asked about the British Army invading
the German homeland, Bismarck remarked that if they did so he would have them arrested
by the Berlin police.
97. J.S. MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC (1843). Mill’s insight here was taken up in H.L.A.
HART AND TONY HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (2d ed. 1985), and in Richard Wright,
Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1735 (1985).
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mobilization for even a strongly necessary event like that to also be a
strongly sufficient event. Indeed, I would venture to say that the only very
strongly sufficient events (for the four war declarations that we seek to explain)
are the intentions of the Kaiser, the Tsar, King George, and Poincare to issue
those very declarations; and as I noted earlier, these relations generate
explanations of too limited an interest because they are too obvious.98
In any event, often when historians speak of sufficiency of one event
for another, they are thinking of inevitability more than of sufficiency (even
including strong sufficiency). This is a confusion that is understandable
and easy enough to make because as we have seen, inevitability is strong
sufficiency in one particular dimension: where x ranges over human actions,
to say that x makes y inevitable is to say that no other human action was
even weakly necessary for y to have occurred. In more conventional
English, to say that one event makes another event inevitable, is to say
that there was nothing anyone could have done to have prevented that
second event. In the context of human action, inevitability is the absence
of preventability by any human action that could have been performed.
And when one event makes another event inevitable in this sense, the first
event becomes saliently important as an explanation of the second event.
Easily missed in this account of inevitability is the role of judgments of
what actions could have been done to prevent things like World War I. I
earlier urged the compatibilist reading of this crucial phrase; the compatibilist
denies that just because some action was itself sufficiently caused by
factors over which the actor had no control, that the actor could not have
done other than he did. But this denial leaves open just what is required
for actors to possess this ability. Clearly their actions have to have had the
power to make a difference. But beyond that, how do we judge what actions
were “possible” for actors like the German Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg?
For example, was it open to him to ignore the command structure of
Germany by ignoring his Kaiser’s refusal to let him, Bethmann-Hollweg,
offer the British the German High Seas Fleet in exchange for British neutrality
(which is what Bethmann-Hollweg desperately wanted to do but was refused
permission to do so by the Kaiser, who loved his soon-to-be proven-useless
boats)? Or consider Moltke’s assertion to the Kaiser that the German
Army could not be turned around to fight the Russians rather than the
French—was that impossible for him to decide to do because the Schlieffen
Plan that he had inherited from his predecessor as Chief of Staff had not
planned for it? When we judge whether any other action could have prevented

98. This was the observation that intentional actions are frequently enough (even though
not always) caused by intentions to do those actions that mentioning such intentions in an
explanation of those actions is otiose.
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the War, we have to decide whether to bound what makes actions available
by considerations beyond mere causal power to prevent.
What gives the outbreak of World War I its tragic sense is the seeming
inevitability of the chain of events once the Archduke was assassinated.
What makes the chronology of events earlier depicted chilling to many of
us as we work through their sequence is the seemingly unstoppable doom
approaching despite the sincere if not effective efforts of some to stop it.
As we have seen, it does take considerable restrictions as to what was
possible for each of the various actors to do to sustain this sense that we
are watching a tragedy unfold that is inevitable in its tragic conclusion.
Ultimately my own judgment is that none of the acts or omissions earlier
recounted made the War inevitable in any strong sense of that word; but
this analysis of inevitability is intended not just to justify that judgment
but to explain why many of us also have the opposite intuition, albeit one
using a much weaker sense of inevitability (in terms of a more restrictive
notion of what was possible for each actor).
VII. CONCLUSION
I have concluded my explication of the most direct explanation of World
War I, an explanation that recites what I have called the bottleneck of
decisions and actions/omissions between June 28 and August 4, 1914.
Yet this is incomplete as an explanation of World War I. Although the
account is intended to be complete (more or less) as a description of the
immediate causes of the conflict, it is far from complete as an overall
explanation because undiscussed are the myriad of more remote factors
that undeniably explain why the actors of July/August 1914 thought as
they did and acted as they did. Indeed, this is where most of the historians
of the War find their interests and spend the bulk of their time and energies.
The makeup of the “powder-keg” is more complicated than is the nature
of the “spark” that we have hitherto been examining. It will thus require
an even longer and more complicated essay to examine it, an essay I hope
to complete in the near future. Still, because the proverbial “spark”—the
assassination of the Archduke and the reactions of European leaders to
that—is indeed an explanatory bottleneck, knowing its nature is essential
to organizing the more remote explanations that I shall pursue in that
succeeding article. For each of those explanations in terms of more remote
factors must operate through the factors we have been exploring as the
bottleneck. The remote and the direct factors thus do not compete with one
another as explanations of the War. Rather, when completely described,
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they should each complement the other in forming together a complete
explanation of World War I.
With regard to the moral responsibility for starting the War, it is of
course possible that lurking in the more remote factors that motivated and
bounded the choice sets of the leaders that we have been discussing, are
explanations that also afford at least a partial excuse for these actors. That
possibility is a further reason to pursue the more remote factors making
up the “powder keg.” My own anticipated conclusion is that, interesting
as are these more remote factors from the vantage point of historiography,
morally they make very little difference to the prima facie case for responsibility
for these actors that we have here explored.
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